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ABSTRACT
The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the United States caused a series of military
events, including the planning and deployment of troops to Afghanistan. In less than a month
after that infamous September day, military Special Forces (SF) members and officers from the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were operating in Afghanistan. The SF and CIA members
were faced with not only the difficult geographical terrain but were hampered by inadequate time
to prepare for the complicated human terrain of the Afghan culture.
In the initial months of the war, these deficiencies were not evident; however, over the
next decade, multiple cross-cultural failures in operations ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq,
would have an impact on the culture of each nation, with bilateral frustration at best and
suffering and death at worst. More than 15 years after 9/11, the military continues to operate in
culturally challenging areas and struggles to prepare service members for such interactions. In
2017 the challenge remains how to increase every service member’s cross-cultural competency.
These research questions are used to examine a specific subculture of the military, known
as the Special Operations community, to include Special Operation Force (SOF) and Marine
Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) members, and to explore the role
cultural education may contribute to enhance individual performance.
Findings suggest that there are definitive differences within the Special Operation Force
community and these differences can be correlated to the varying degrees of cross-cultural
training and education. Further, there is evidence that additional and specialized training assisted
certain members of the SOF to better navigate the human terrain and understand the intricate
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nature of cross-cultural understanding. Additionally, it is clear there are areas needing
improvement in the entire SOF community and the military in general.
Conclusions realized from this study demonstrate the necessity for cross-cultural training
and education as an important complement to the Band-Aids-and-bullets mentality in securing
bilateral success in the varying human terrain for all stakeholders. It is essential for the
Department of Defense and the SOF commands to identify where, when, what, and how to
implement formal cross-cultural programs for the future success of the United States war
fighting and peace keeping missions, as well as to serve the alliances of multinational
collaborations.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Against an enemy who fights unconventionally . . . it is more important to
understand motivation, intent, method, and culture than to have a few more
meters of precision, knots of speed, or bits of bandwidth.
Robert H. Scales, Culture Centric Warfare
Bo Parker grew up in a small town just outside Topeka, Kansas, the only child of a state
trooper father and a banker mother. His high school graduating class consisted of one hundred
thirty-five students, most of whom, like Bo, were white, middle class, and had known each other
for more than a decade. After graduation, 18-year-old Bo joined the United States Marine Corps,
and flew to San Diego, California, for recruit training. Not only was it the first time Bo had been
on an airplane, it was the first time he had been out of Kansas.
The Marine Corps was an alien world to Bo. While being part of a team was familiar to
him—he had played football and baseball in school—he had never before encountered the
ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity he found among his new Marine brothers. When other
recruits asked him what he was, Bo would simply reply “American,” an answer that only
solicited more questions. “No, what are you? Italian, Irish, French, what?” This followup
question further confused him, as he had never known anyone to identify as anything other than
American. Bo was not in Kansas anymore.
After completing recruit training, Bo left the protective bubble of the Marine Corps
Recruit Depot and went to Infantry Training School (ITS) in Camp Pendleton, California. While
only forty-five miles north of San Diego, Pendleton seemed to be a new world. Bo met seasoned
Marines who regaled him with war stories of courageous adventures, narrow escapes, and of a
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primitive enemy who was savage and cunning, more animal than human. At the end of his ITS
training, Bo was eager to join their ranks to collect stories of his own.
Six months after he left Kansas, Bo received orders for his first deployment to the
Helmand Province of Afghanistan. As a newly minted member of the world’s most elite military
fraternity, Bo flew over the Hindu Kush Mountains armed with knowledge and training his
younger self could never have imagined. He marveled at his journey and the jagged beauty of
the landscape below him, but this confidence and wonder would soon be replaced by fear,
confusion, and a deep sense of isolation.
Bo was three weeks into his tour, waiting for his first combat experience, eager to employ
his training and his weapon. On his first patrol, he glanced to his right and saw two boys playing
in the road, kicking a half deflated soccer ball down the pitted Humvee tire ruts.
With no warning, explosions followed by mortar rounds and small arms fire erupted
around Bo and his platoon. Training took over as Bo hit the ground. He looked up and surveyed
the scene. The two boys lay sprawled in the dirt, their bodies lifeless. Violent screams from his
fellow Marines were heard, Bo swiveled. He saw Chris, a fellow Marine, writhing on the
ground, shouting at him. Wild thoughts fired in rapid succession as Bo moved. His eyes
searched for cover while his left arm grabbed the top of Chris’ drag strap. He found a trench
about two body lengths away and dragged himself and the nearly unconscious Chris down into
the fetid liquid at the bottom of the trench. Within moments, other Marines joined Bo and Chris
in their makeshift fighting hole. The Marines were cussing the enemy yet calmly ordering other
Marines to locate the enemy positions and put together a plan to stop the enemy advance and to
kill them. A Navy Corpsman jumped into the trench and immediately tended to Chris. Bo was
ordered to position himself above the trench to cover the road that ran parallel to their position.
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He lay on the bank and faced the road, weapon ready, feet lying below him in the heady mix of
sewage and Chris’ blood.
The mortar rounds stopped, but the rustling of the poppies sounded like a heavy metal
band’s thrumming hiss to Bo’s adrenalin-addled brain. He heard the motorcycle, a dusty Honda
Avenger with a grating engine, before he saw it. Determined to execute his orders and to protect
his wounded friend, Bo placed himself between his brothers and the approaching bike. He
screamed and waved his hands above his head, motioning the rider to stop, a gesture he was sure
anyone would understand. The bike continued its approach and then began to accelerate. Bo
raised and aimed his weapon. He rotated the safety switch to fire, relaxed his breathing, and
placed his finger on the trigger.
Just as Bo was ready to squeeze his first shot, his sergeant ordered him to stand down.
Angry and confused, the young Marine demanded to know why he had been stopped. The
sergeant, a seasoned veteran of the war in Afghanistan, explained to Bo that he had given the
motorcyclist the wrong hand gesture. In this culture, yelling and waving your arms, as Bo had
done, was a signal to proceed quickly through the area, not to stop. The motorcyclist had been
trying to follow Bo’s instructions.
Statement of the Problem
A gap in cross-cultural competency training affects our military service members in the
performance of their missions, increasing the opportunity for costly mistakes, injury, and death
to stakeholders. The need for cross-cultural cooperation has grown exponentially with the
closing of the 20th century. Arguably, there remians a deficiency in cross-cultural competency,
which causes a major dilemma for a global community, which has never been more intertwined.
This accelerated expansion started with the World Wide Web and continued to expand in all
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areas of business, government, geopolitical actions, and international terrorism. This research
concentrates on the military sector and examines the Special Operation Force community, thus
the research will focus heavily on the terrorism aspect of the global community and the need for
cross-cultural competency in a military context.
The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
triggered a level of awareness of terrorism never before known in the United States. The attacks
prompted the United States to immediately shift to a defensive posture by shutting down airspace
and preparing for other possible attacks on the homeland. In the days after 9/11, Americans
rallied together, along with gathering united support from the international community. It was
only a matter of time before the United States would respond with force. The expected use of
power was assumed by Americans and acceptable to most of the international community in its
openly expressed and unconditional support for the United States. As the federal, state, and local
leadership concentrated on the recovery operation, the military leadership prepared to respond
with force against terrorism that would initially concentrate on Al Qaeda training camps in
Afghanistan, but would soon turn in to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
When the first Special Forces (SF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers
arrived in Afghanistan 15 days after 9/11, the United States was unprepared for the cultural
aspect of a war in a region like Afghanistan. Nevertheless, these SF and CIA officers laid the
groundwork for the official United States military assault, which commenced on October 7, 2001
(Taddeo, 2010). Understandably, priority was not given to cross-cultural education in
Afghanistan, as at that moment in time all focus was on ousting and killing the terrorists. The
notion of winning hearts and minds would follow much later in the continued GWOT.
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Afghanistan presented a difficult physical and cultural terrain. Ranging from the austere
Hindu Kush Mountains to the high desert plains found throughout much of the country, the
country’s roads and infrastructure were at the level expected of a poor, developing nation made
worse by the damage inflicted throughout the area from decades of ethnic and religious fighting.
Culturally, Afghanistan is made up of approximately 60 major and 400 minor Pashtun tribes
speaking more than thirty languages, an interesting and challenging cultural mixture (The
Economist, 2008).
As the invasion of Afghanistan continued, the mission quickly took on a political
dimension that required an Afghan face be placed on the war; in particular, the search for Osama
bin Laden (Schmitt & Shanker, 2011). This proved to be a nearly impossible military and
cultural undertaking, because previous to the invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan military was
virtually nonexistent, and tribal warlords and the Taliban ruled the country. Consequently,
Afghanistan presented the enormous challenge of fighting a stateless, asymmetrical enemy in an
extremely difficult physical and cultural terrain. As such, language, religion, morals, and ethics
became as important as any other consideration on the battlefield (Thompson & Jetly, 2014).
In 2003 the war on terror shifted to the invasion of Iraq, and United States and Coalition
Forces were faced with an entirely different physical and cultural terrain than that faced in
Afghanistan. Iraq was more the urban environment of a developed nation, separated by vast
spaces of wind-swept desert dotted by hundreds of date palm groves, yet Iraq leaves the
impression of modernity.
In spite of this sense of modernity, Iraq presented immense cultural challenges. Ruled by
the vicious and repressive Sunni Muslim minority government of Saddam Hussein in a majority
Shia Muslim country, Coalition Forces faced a confusing patchwork of Sunni and Shia Arabs,
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Iraqi Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkmen. As a consequence of not understanding the culture, a
vacuum was created quickly after the invasion. Sepp (2007) confronts the issue that this vacuum
allowed the war on terror to spread well beyond Iraq, with involvement continuing in Northern
Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Turkey. Furthermore, Sepp (2007) argues that with this daunting task of
winning hearts and minds through a mix of languages and cultures, cross-cultural awareness
preparedness has become an essential requirement for success in both the military and political
aspects of the global war on terror.
While Bo’s story is fictional, it is a narrative derived from several Marines that resonates
in current diverse challenges faced by military service members. After more than fifteen years
and over a billion dollars spent on research to deliver to the battlefield a cross-culturally
competent warrior, the Department of Defense (DoD) has yet to settle on a universal tool to
assess cross-culture competency (3C) (Gallus, et al., 2014). To further aggravate this issue is a
shrinking military budget, as the DoD calls upon its leaders to do more with less (McManus,
2012). Senior Army leader General Raymond Odierno made several comments from lessons
learned in Iraq, emphasizing the need for improved cultural awareness and the importance of the
human domain (McManus, 2012). General Odierno stated, “the best equipped army in the world
can still lose a war if it doesn’t understand the people it’s fighting” (McManus, 2012, p. 3).
The attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent years have proved challenging
for a political and military leadership that has had to manage two different wars in two different
cultures. The United States continues to provide Special Operation Forces to fight the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as ISIS in the Western world and Daesh in the
Middle East. To overpower such groups, the need for cross-cultural competency may be argued
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to be one of the emerging challenges facing the Department of Defense (DoD) and research has
identified 3C as a necessity to meet the diverse human terrain (Gallus, et al., 2014).
Two of the greatest concerns for cross-cultural challenges are to assist service members
to function at a higher capacity in different cultures and to provide leadership with an improved
approach to defeat the enemy by understanding its culture (Gallus, et al., 2014). To reach an
acceptable level of cultural awareness, cross-cultural competency is an agreed-upon concept by
military leadership and academic professionals as a vital contributor to mission success (Gallus
et al., 2014). However, what has not been agreed on is how to get there, or even where “there”
is. The problem continues to rest in how to establish, understand, and change a warrior’s cultural
competency (Gallus et al., 2014).
The United States military continues to revise its current training programs to better
prepare forces to meet missions. To do that, the DoD begins by defining a term to be used in its
understanding of cultural awareness called Cross-Cultural Competency (3C). Cross-Cultural
Competency is a “set of knowledge, skills, and affect motivation that enables individuals to adapt
effectively in cross-cultural environments” (Abbe, Gulick, & Herman, 2007, p. vii). This
definition supports all missions that are expected of the service members, whether peacekeeping,
humanitarian, or combat; undoubtedly all of these missions place the service members in crosscultural environments.
By defining 3C, the DoD is responsible for implementing a method based on identifying
vulnerabilities in service member’s 3C. Further, there is the responsibility to educate service
members to improve their competency and cultural awareness, with the understanding that this
provides bilateral global success. To be clear, cultural awareness is not the same as cultural
intelligence and competence (Livermore, 2015). The approach to cross-cultural understanding
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through merely the use of cultural awareness training fails to account for many variables such as
cognitive, emotion, motivation, and behavior modification factors (Livermore, 2015).
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study is to provide new research to better prepare men and women of
the armed forces for the cross-cultural challenges needed for mission success. The study offers
new research to address the problems of cultural competency through a mixed method approach
with the collection of relevant data from the target sample population. The former Special
Operation Force (SOF) and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC)
members offer an excellent opportunity for insight, as well as being a target sample group not
well researched.
This research utilized a combination of quantitative and qualitative surveys selected to
identify what role, if any, cultural education has played in the careers of the target population
members. Additionally, the data allow the researcher to compare variants between the groups
and identify possible beneficial impact areas unique to one group or to one person. The literature
review demonstrates a demand for better cross-cultural training.
The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced events that demonstrate a
lack of cultural understanding. For example, the case that drew a vast amount of negative crosscultural attention was the Iraq Abu Ghraib prison story. This was a highly controversial
mishandling of prisoners that had global consequences. This story generated international
condemnation of the United States’ policy and is evidence something is wrong with the
military’s efforts on cross-cultural education. Further, this event and others like it highlight the
importance of cross-cultural understanding and competency for mission success. Finally, the
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aim of this study is to add to existing research that allows others to build on the results provided
in this study.
Research Questions
Research Question 1
How do the results of selected SOF and MEUSOC groups vary on the Cultural
Intelligence Scale (CQS) self-assessment survey?
H1o. Army Green Berets from Group B will outperform Group A due to their heightened
cross-cultural relationships with their mission enabling them to take on a unique role over
other SOF and MEUSOC members by living and operating within a different culture
setting.
H1a. Army Green Berets from Group B will not outperform Group A due to their
heightened cross-cultural relationships with their mission causing them to take on a
unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members by living and operating within a
different culture setting.
Research Question 2
How do the sample groups’ scores compare with the current database consisting of 98
countries and over 58,000 business participants as of December 2016?
H2o. Groups A and B median scores will be equal to or higher than the Cultural
Intelligence Centers Database.
H2a. Groups A and B median scores will not be equal to or higher than the Cultural
Intelligence Center database.
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Research Question 3
How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute and correlate
with the CQS survey?
H3o. The open ended design of the qualitative survey will discover correlations patterns
between the sample groups and CQ database.
H3a. The open ended design of the qualitative survey will not discover correlations
patterns between the sample groups and CQ database.
Conceptual Framework
The research is grounded in two major concepts: Cross-cultural competence and
assessment of cultural competence. The method presented allows access to and monitors service
members’ levels of cross-cultural competency through the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS).
The research explores how that data and the additional mixed method surveys may be used to
further research in the advancement of 3C. This includes cross-cultural education, cross-cultural
training, immersion in cross cultural environments, higher motivation, and behavior
modification.
The study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative collection methods. Creswell (2012)
argues that when quantitative and qualitative methods are combined the design becomes a mixed
method design (p. 535). Further, Creswell (2012) offers varieties of the mixed method design.
For this study, the value of the quantitative data is substantial. As such, this data must be given
first priority when combining the quantitative and qualitative data, what Creswell refers to as a
two-part study or an explanatory sequential design (2012). Two approaches are used in this
research. The first includes two surveys: a demographic survey and the Cultural Intelligence
Scale (CQS) survey; and a quantitative survey that provides critical data regarding group scores,
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standings between groups, and a comparison with the 58,000 member database at the Cultural
Intelligence Center (Cultural Intelligence Center, 2016).
The second approach utilizes a qualitative survey to gather personal expressions of the
participants and uses this information to further develop conclusions in figures 1 and 2.

12

Scope, Limitations, and Assumptions
This study examines two distinct groups consisting of former members of the special
operations community. The research utilizes a cross-section of former Special Operation Force
(SOF) and Marine Expeditionary Force Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) community,
with participants representing the Navy SEALs Special Boat Unit, the Marine Corps
Reconnaissance community, Marine Snipers and Marine Special Operations Command Raider
Battalions, Army Rangers, Air Force Para Rescue and Special Operations Aviation Regiment
and Special Forces (Green Beret) members. One of the limitations of this study was the
difficulty of working with active duty military and the requirements of the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) process from both the university and the military. As a result, the research
concentrates on former service members representing the above SOF and MEUSOC groups. An
additional limitation of this study is the need to employ distance-based research methods vis-à-
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vis online surveys due to the researcher’s location in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and the
varied locations of the research participants.
The research relies on several assumptions. First, it must be assumed that cultural
intelligence (CQ), which is measured through the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS), is a form of
knowledge independent of other kinds of knowledge and is distinctly measurable through the
CQS. Second, the framework established by Earley and Ang (2003) assumes that CQ is the
force behind cultural success in the diverse community that forms the database of the Cultural
Intelligence Center.
The final assumption pertains to the CQS as self-report survey based on a participant’s
self-perception. The researcher assumes that participants are both truthful and able to report
accurately on their knowledge and behavior. This point has been of some concern among
academics and was addressed in the DoD’s annotated bibliography, which suggests that selfevaluations alone may not relay accurately the truth of one’s cross-cultural competency (Gallus
et al., 2014).
Significance of the Study
The focus of this research is two-fold. First, the research will examine the correlations
and variants between the sample Groups A and B. The research will identify similarities and
differences between the groups as well as assess the data against the Cultural Intelligence
Center’s database of over 58,000 professionals, which currently represents 98 countries as of
December 2016 (Van Dyne, Ang & Koh, 2015). Second, the research will examine the data
collected in an open-ended qualitative survey provided by the sample group members. This data
provides personal documentation of the groups’ understanding, use, and implementation of
cross-cultural knowledge.
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The literature review provides a foundation that acknowledges the cultural challenges in
modern-day, asymmetrical warfare and the requirement for the use of cross-cultural techniques
to increase mission success. The study also presents perspectives that emerge through a review
of scholarly writings to examine the concept of Cultural Intelligence (CQ), discuss the impact of
the cultural terrain on military outcomes in irregular warfare, and review the methodological
philosophies behind the current training of service members, especially Marines and Special
Operation Force warriors.
The military has been the subject of decades-long exploratory research in the field of
cross-cultural relationships. However, further research is needed to determine how the military
can train its warriors to navigate the cultural terrain of operational environments. One possible
emerging approach to such training involves increasing service members’ level of cross-cultural
competency through increased cultural intelligence.
An overwhelming majority of scholars and military leaders agree that some form of
cultural awareness training is critical to navigate the cultural terrain today and the future (Gallus
et al., 2014). Yet, after more than 15 years of fighting and over a billion dollars invested in
confronting the topic of culture, the military has only identified the importance in developing a
cross-cultural competent warrior program (Gallus et al., 2014). Indeed, an argument can be
made that the Department of Defense continues to fall short in how to measure and then to
increase 3C. The study’s significance lies in its focus on the value of the Cultural Intelligence
Scale as a measurement tool through the assessment of the two sample groups. The expectation
is the findings will contribute to future research and the integration of cultural intelligence and
cross-cultural competency to assist military communities in training culturally competent
warriors.
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Working Definitions
•

Adaptive Performance: addresses one’s overall ability to alter one’s behavior, which
allows one to adapt to a new environment or situation; in the case of this research and
literature review, this relates to cross-cultural situations.

•

Behavioral CQ: is also referred to as CQ Action (Livermore, 2011). It is one’s ability to
exhibit verbal and non-verbal signs of communication when interacting in a crosscultural setting. This includes appropriate behavior in these settings (Ang & Van Dyne,
2008). It is the backbone of one’s interaction in a multicultural setting, as it demands
constant attention to one’s bearing and presentation so as to not offend anyone. It mixes
closely with motivation, as it requires a constant vigilance to operate in demanding
situations (Livermore, 2010).

•

Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL): The Marine Corps
component of cultural and language training center, based out of Quantico and affiliated
with the Marine Corps University.

•

Cognitive Intelligence: the lowest order between metacognitive and cognitive that
examines an individual’s norms, practices, and conceived concepts of information realms
but in this context relates to cultural concepts. This is usually gained through education,
social interactions, and family ideas that are already deeply embedded in a person at a
young age (Ang & Dyne, 2008).

•

Cross-Cultural Competency (3C): is a “set of knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation
that enables individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments” (Gallus et al.,
2014, p. vi)
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•

Cultural Intelligence (CQ): is defined as an individual’s aptitude to function and to
operate smoothly in cross-cultural settings. This is designed for real-world application
motivated by the reality of the global work place that requires individuals to operate in
multicultural settings. It does not take away from IQ, SQ, EQ or any other measureable
quality, as it concentrates only on the cross-cultural setting. Early and Ang (2003)
worked on moving beyond cognitive abilities to define what differentiates CQ from the
rest by the ability to remain non-culturally specific, thus allowing the user to operate
efficiently in any cultural setting (Ang & Dyne, 2008).

•

Emotional Intelligence (EQ): deals with the individual’s ability to handle emotions and is
closely related to CQ, as they are both based outside of academia and based on real-world
settings (Ang & Dyne, 2008). The major difference is that one’s EQ may be high in one
cultural setting with which they are familiar. However, this approach does not work in
every culture thus making it culturally specific, whereas CQ is not culturally specific.

•

Force Multiplier: any added element, equipment, training, intelligence, or other capability
that increases the success of a unit or battle. For this research it considers CQ, 3C, and
other cross-cultural tools that assist the service member.

•

General Intelligence (IQ): is the ability to focus and make decisions correctly with
outside diversions. This is not culturally specific and relates to any abstract situation.

•

Global War on Terrorism: the term GWOT came about shortly after the attack of
September 11, 2001. In early October 2001, President George W. Bush initiated
operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda group members hiding in Afghanistan,
where Al Qaeda operated and from where they operated terrorist training camps.
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•

Human Terrain System: this was an extremely well funded social science experiment
backed by Washington, D.C. Its importance in this study is to understand that not every
social experiment proves effective for the military. Other issues faced included the
reality that placing social scientists in war zones proved difficult. The members were
made up of mostly anthropology PhDs tasked to provide information, later described as
intelligence, on the local civilian population, to U.S. military leaders. They were to be
the eyes and the ears of the cultural landscape and to report how to operate within the
cultural terrain. At times, the scientists’ information may have been used to form tactical
decisions, including those leading to casualties of war.

•

Metacognitive: refers to an individual’s level of conscious cultural awareness during
cross-cultural interactions and is considered the highest order of the cognitive processes
(Ang & Dyne, 2008). People with strength in metacognitive CQ consciously question
their own cultural assumptions, reflect during interactions, and adjust their cultural
knowledge when interacting with those from other cultures. Metacognitive CQ involves
higher-level cognitive strategies that allow individuals to develop new heuristics and
rules for social interaction in novel cultural environments by promoting information
processing at a deeper level (Ang & Dyne, 2008). Additionally, some people group
metacognitive with cognitive, which may cause confusion in some references in the
literature.

•

Motivational CQ: is also referred to as CQ Drive (Livermore, 2011). It is one’s capability
to drive attention and energy to the task at hand. In this case, one must demonstrate
motivation in a cross-cultural setting to make every attempt to control a positive outcome
in given situations. There are two requirements to accomplish this task. The first is the
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expectation of successful accomplishment of the task and the second is the ability to see
the value associated with accomplishing that task (Ang & Dyne, 2008).
•

Special Forces or Green Berets: is the Army’s counterinsurgent force. They have many
other missions but are of special interest to this study as they primarily operate in crosscultural environments.

•

Special Operation Forces: the study examines a group combined of special warfare
operators from all military branches, including: Marine Corps Special Operations
Command with Raiders and Force Recon, Navy SEALs, Army Special Forces (Green
Beret) and Army Rangers, Air Force Para Rescue and Combat Control Teams.

•

Social Intelligence (SQ): is one’s ability to get along with others in social settings, the
success of which is measured in both verbal and in nonverbal actions and based on many
learned skills (Ang & Dyne, 2008).

•

Warrior Diplomat: A term used primarily in the Special Forces community; however, it is
now an academic term used to describe SOF members who struggle with two missions:
the first as a warrior, and the second as a diplomat.

•

Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC): The Marine Corps
standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization. The Marine
expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) is a Marine expeditionary
unit, augmented with selected personnel and equipment that is trained and equipped with
an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious operations and a variety of specialized
missions of limited scope and duration. These capabilities include specialized
demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, in-extremis hostage
recovery, and enabling operations for follow-on forces. The MEU(SOC) is not a Special
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Operations force but, when directed by the Secretary of Defense, the combatant
commander, and/or other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations
in extremis, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable.
Conclusions
David Livermore (2015), of the Cultural Intelligence Center, reveals there has been a
recognized deficiency in studying the military and the primary focus in the development of
cross-cultural representatives has been concentrated on the global marketplace and the business
community. The military is a logical participant that could prove an invaluable addition to the
cultural intelligence CQ literary body of work.
The aforementioned story of Bo Parker provides an explanation of the difficulties in the
absurd normality of war that troops face. Men and women will continue to encounter a ruthless
enemy, which they are responsible to fight while maintaining a conscious effort to remain crossculturally competent. This factor is extremely important as warriors fight near or among noncombatant civilians as the civilian population that surrounds the battlefield is a regrettable reality
of war. Such reality must be dealt with in a proactive manner, not a reactive one. The notion of
winning hearts and minds has been a longstanding policy implemented by presidential
administrations and is synonymous with defeating the enemy. Yet, the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) uncovered an enemy that is a cunningly indigenous, unconventional, and an irregular
warrior unlike that of a conventional military force (Jones, 2012). Further, the enemy does not
easily defer to a civilian-friendly concept, as they continue to apply their own terroristic strategy
counter to the strategy of winning of hearts and minds.
For the most part, the leadership has been faced with a nationless enemy, one who is not
supported nor directed by one single government but is driven by mixed causes. To further
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complicate the issue, the enemy is indistinguishable by the unifying factor of a common military
uniform, as he dresses exactly like the local civilian population (Jones, 2012). Working with the
culture is critical in these types of warfare, and exploiting a local population for intelligence,
assistance, and resistance against this type of enemy demands cultural competency by all
stakeholders.
Cultural intelligence has proved highly successful in the business sector and, when used
throughout the international community, can serve as a force to be embraced by the military
community (Spencer & Balasevicius, 2009). Further, the United States Department of Defense
(DoD) has invested enormous sums of money and countless years in pursuit of a cultural
advantage (Gallus et al., 2014). This researcher hopes the findings serve as an essential
contribution to the existing literature on the link between the military, education, and cultural
intelligence, and its future within the military culture.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of the Literature
And when people are entering upon war they do things the wrong way around.
Action comes first and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin
to think.
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War
Chapter one introduced the complex problem of integrating an effective cross-cultural
awareness method in the military. The Department of Defense (DoD) has experienced the
struggles associated with confronting cross-cultural conundrums. In particular, identifying a
reliable assessment method to review the service members’ level of cultural awareness and a
realistic approach to increasing DoD cross-culture competency. This chapter presents existing
literature over cross-cultural research, cross-cultural awareness, military cross-cultural
competency, how cross-cultural training is managed in smaller elite units, and case studies of
success and failures since 9/11. Finally, this chapter will identify areas where future research
may prove productive.
This literature review is organized in two key parts. Part one focuses on the importance
of understanding culture and cross-cultural communication defined from a social science context.
This is a critical area where the literature review will examine culture, establish techniques and
tools to measure an individual’s culture awareness, and provide an introduction to cultural
intelligence (CQ) and the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) personal assessment survey, which
will be the primary tool used in the research design. Part two will examine DoD’s previous and
current path and challenges to win hearts and minds through cross-cultural training in the search
for cross-cultural competency.
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The literature review examines the military in general and, although the entire DoD as an
organization is used throughout the review, the research focuses on smaller, elite units that since
9/11 have demonstrated arguably higher cross-cultural exposure. The researcher’s intent in
examining smaller units such as the Marine Corps and Special Operation Forces communities is
to present a more practical micro-approach to the study, which fits best into this type of
academic dissertation process. It is also important to note that this research focuses primarily on
utilizing modern data and literature from the post 9/11 era.
Part I
Understanding Culture Through the Lens of Social Science
To fully comprehend the concept of cross-cultural preparedness, it is necessary to first
define what culture is from a social science perspective. Because the definition of culture itself
may constitute a subjective, confusing mix of values, behaviors, and beliefs, no single definition
is likely to satisfy all social scientists. For the purposes of this dissertation, some shared
understanding of a definition of culture is necessary.
Definitions of Culture
The University of Minnesota’s Center for the Advanced Research on Language
Acquisition (CARLA), defines culture as “shared patterns of behaviors and interactions,
cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that are learned through a process of
socialization” (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 1). These consistent patterns distinguish the
members of one cultural group from another group.
James A. Banks and Cherry A. McGee Banks argue that culture is not an object, but
instead a byproduct of all the interpretations of those objects that provide a sense of who a
people are and where they come from (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 2).
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Most social scientists today view culture as consisting primarily of the symbolic,
ideational, and intangible aspects of human societies. The essence of a culture is not its artifacts,
tools, or other tangible cultural elements, but how the members of the group interpret, use, and
perceive them. It is the values, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives that distinguish one
people from another in modernized societies, not material objects and other tangible aspects of
human societies (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 2). People within a culture usually
interpret the meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviors in the same or in similar ways
(University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 2).
Louise Damien defines culture as “learned and shared human patterns or models for
living; day-to-day living patterns. These patterns and models pervade all aspects of human
social interaction. Culture is mankind’s primary adaptive mechanism” (University of Minnesota,
2016, para. 3).
According to John and Ruth Useem, “Culture has been defined in a number of ways, but
most simply, as the learned and shared behavior of a community of interacting human beings”
(University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 9).
Numerous other definitions of culture exist, but for the purposes of this study the
definition provided by John Paul Lederach, that “culture is the shared knowledge and schemes
created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social
realities around them,” seems to be most useful (University of Minnesota, 2016, para. 7).
Hofstede’s six intercultural dimensions. If culture is “shared knowledge,” then culture,
according to Geert Hofstede, must be “learned through a process of socialization” (Hofstede &
Hofstede, 2005, p. 4). Consequently, if culture can be learned through exposure to another
culture (i.e., socialization), the hopes of the military to increase the cultural competency and
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awareness of soldiers at the front lines is not futile. However, if it can be argued that there are
some learned traits and behaviors that allow certain individuals to be more receptive to and
successful in multi-cultural settings, then several important questions follow. Answers to these
questions would allow leaders to identify why certain individuals are able to perform more
successfully than others in multi-cultural environments.
•

What trait or traits allow one person to accept, adapt to, or adopt another

culture more easily and quickly than his or her colleagues?
•

Is there a way to measure a person’s ability to learn and accept culture?

•

What factors have an impact on a person’s ability to do this?

To begin identifying those behaviors and values that contribute to cross-cultural success,
Geert Hofstede breaks down culture into several dimensions that describe the effects of a
society’s culture on the values of its members, and how these values relate to behavior (Hofstede
& Hofstede, 2011, p. 7).

Figure 3. Hofstede’s Six Intercultural Dimensions Model (Anastasia, 2015).
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Hofstede’s Six Intercultural Dimensions may be defined in more detail as follows:
1. Power Distance: This dimension explains the extent to which members who are
less powerful in a society accept and expect that the distribution of power takes
place unequally (Anastasia, 2015).
2. Uncertainty Avoidance: It is a dimension that describes the extent to which people
in society are not at ease with ambiguity and uncertainty (Anastasia, 2015).
3. Individualism vs. Collectivism: The focus of this dimension is on the question of
whether people prefer being left alone to look after themselves or want to remain
in a closeknit network (Anastasia, 2015).
4. Masculinity vs. Femininity: Masculinity implies a society’s preference for
assertiveness, heroism, achievement, and material reward for attaining success.
On the contrary, femininity represents a preference for modesty, cooperation,
quality of life, and caring for the weak (Anastasia, 2015).
5. Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation: Long-term orientation describes the
inclination of a society toward searching for virtue. Short-term orientation
pertains to those societies that are strongly inclined toward the establishment of
the absolute truth (Anastasia, 2015).
6. Indulgence vs. Restraint: This revolves around the degree to which societies can
exercise control over their impulses and desires (Anastasia, 2015).
Each dimension of Hofstede’s model identifies certain specific challenges the military
faces in training culturally adaptive warriors. The military, of course, is founded on the expected
unequal distribution of power through the concept of chain of command. Understanding the
Hofstede & Hofstede (2011) model could easily lead to a feeling of superiority of military
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service members over less developed inferior people. This feeling would be compounded when
dealing with native populations for whom unequal distribution of power is not as ingrained at it
is in the military. By the same token, neither ambiguity nor uncertainty is encouraged by the
concept of the chain of command, yet situations in which the military is interacting with a local
population are fraught with a high degree of uncertainty.
Simply put, members of the military operate based on a “shared knowledge and schemes
created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social
realities around them” (Lederach, 1995, p. 9). This problem is further exacerbated by the fact
military members represent a greater selection of America's cross-culture society, which allows
the military the ability to operate with an unequal distribution of power, further ensuring the
avoidance of ambiguity and uncertainty. Furthermore, one of the premier values of the military,
particularly at the level of the combat unit, is loyalty to the group in what Hofstede calls
“Collectivism.”
This intense loyalty to one’s brothers and sisters in arms creates a powerful in-group
culture, that sees anyone outside the group as a less trusted “other,” making building trusting
relations with a foreign population extremely difficult. Combining this lack of trust with combat
environments and the culture of masculinity so pervasive in the military results in a sharp
contrast to those cultures that show a higher preference for qualities found in Hofstede’s
femininity dimension (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2011). For example, Islam has a higher
requirement for modesty and Bedouin tribal communities share a deeper sense for cooperation
and quality of life (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2011).
Finally, the short-term orientation that characterizes American culture in general is quite
different from the long-term perspective that characterizes many native cultures that are centuries
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old. Furthermore, restraint is not a highly regarded value in America, particularly in its youth. In
short, Hofstede’s model describes the monumental task the military faces in creating a “boots on
the ground” force sensitized to the immense demands of cross-cultural understanding and
interaction.
The cultural iceberg theory. If Hofstede’s six intercultural dimension’s help define the
challenges faced by the military in developing an understanding of other cultures, the “Cultural
Iceberg Theory” identifies one possible way forward. Originally developed by Edward T. Hall
in his book Beyond Culture (1976), Hall argues that culture is like an iceberg. In figure 4 the tip
of the iceberg represents those parts of a culture that are visible, while those much larger parts of
a culture are represented by the part of the iceberg that is below the water and thus not
immediately visible.

28

Figure 4. The cultural iceberg drawing demonstrates the surface and sub-surface of cultural
dimensions (Hall, 2017).
The external component of the iceberg encompasses the conscious part of a culture,
including immediately visible aspects, such as dress, art, literature, food, religion, and language.
Conversely, the internal, unconscious aspects of a culture are represented by those parts of the
iceberg that are below water, thus not immediately seen, such as unspoken beliefs, values, and
thoughts. In fact, it is possible to argue these are the very unspoken aspects of culture identified
by Hofstede.
According to Hall, (1976) for anyone in business or in the military to navigate
successfully within a foreign culture, developing knowledge of and actively participating in the
visible tip of the iceberg is essential, as well as actively seeking to understand those parts of the
culture that are not immediately visible (Bennett, 2004, p. 10). As Dr. Paula Calligiuri (2012)
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points out, developing the proficiency to operate in unfamiliar cultures clearly involves more
than the acquisition of cultural facts or the ability to overcome cultural bias. Cross-cultural
success requires the application of a cultural agility that enables one to integrate learned skills
into a broader cultural awareness (Calligiuri, 2012).
Cross-Cultural Assessment Tools
There is a preexisting correlation between the military and academic psychology dating
back to the First World War. Building on the work of French psychologist Alfred Binet, the
military developed a wide range of psychological testing due to the need for vocational
assessment, placement, and training. Because of the military’s awareness that involvement in
warfare could have dramatic consequences for the mental health and wellbeing of its personnel,
the military has continued this relationship with academia (Pols & Oak, 2007). During the 20th
century, U.S. military psychiatrists tried to deal with the consequences of combat while
contributing to the military’s tradition of supporting its personnel and reducing the debilitating
impact of psychiatric episodes (Pols & Oak, 2007). Screening programs were implemented to
detect factors that predispose individuals to mental disorders, thus setting the stage for early
intervention strategies for acute war-related syndromes and the treatment of long-term
psychiatric disability after deployment (Pols & Oak, 2007).
In an effort to measure levels of cultural competence throughout private and government
sectors, several institutes developed proprietary measurement tools. Initially, the impetus to
develop such tools was borne from a need within the counseling psychology field that recognized
the importance of working with clients within a culturally appropriate context.
Cultural competence self-assessment questionnaire (CCSAQ). One such institute is
the Portland Research and Training Center that developed the CCSAQ (Mason, 1995). The
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CCSAQ is based on the Child and Adolescent Service System Program (CASSP) Cultural
Competence Model (Cross et al., 1989), which describes competency in terms of four
dimensions: attitude, practice, policy, and structure (Mason, 1995). The tool is designed to assist
family and child service agency employees to assess their cross-cultural strengths and
weaknesses. Such an assessment permits the development of therapeutic interventions that
promote cultural competency in the field.
Originally the CCSAQ was developed for use in child and adolescent mental health
systems, but the measurement tool has since been applied to varied human service disciplines
along the lines of alcohol and drug abuse treatment, maternal and child health, juvenile justice,
child welfare, public health, and education (Mason, 1995). Organizations used the CCSAQ to
assess cultural competence training needs in areas such as improvement of service delivery to
culturally diverse populations, identification of existing organizational cross-cultural strengths,
and the development of relevant training topics for service providers (Mason, 1995). The tool
was originally intended to assist service providers who work with groups of color, yet its
applicability to other groups is valid (Mason, 1995). The CCSAQ was not selected as the
measurement tool of choice for the purposes of this study due to its bases in child behavior
counseling, which did not prove to be a relevant match for the military community.
Multicultural counseling inventory (MCI). The MCI developed by Gargi RoysircarSofowsky, Professor and Director of the Multicultural Center at Antioch University New
England, is yet another self-report instrument used to measure multicultural counseling
competencies. It uses a survey of 40 self-reported statements rated on a 4-point Likert scale
from very inaccurate (1) to very accurate (4) (Roysircar-Sofowsky, 1996). The author developed
the MCI as a search for more dimensions than the three existing recognized dimensions
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(multicultural counseling skills, multicultural awareness, multicultural and multicultural
counseling knowledge) with the motive to achieve a more comprehensive self-assessment tool
encompassing four dimensions; the fourth dimension being multicultural counseling
relationships (Roysircar-Sofowsky, 1996).
Cross cultural adaptability inventory (CCAI). Another self-assessment tool to
measure one’s level of cultural competence is the CCAI, which can facilitate the transition in to
new or different surroundings. The CCAI was first published in 1992 and developed
collaboratively by Colleen Kelley, a human relations consultant who specializes in cross-cultural
training, and Judith Meyers, a psychologist who concentrates on assessment and diagnosis
(Meyers, 2016). After an exhaustive search for an appropriate training tool yielded no results,
they worked to create their own system. This system is used to promote multi-cultural
discussions in training settings, prepare individuals for travel or study abroad, and to improve the
counseling of individuals considering life changes involving other cultures (Meyers, 2016).
The CCAI facilitates the identification of an individual’s or group’s strengths and
weaknesses in four skill areas that are fundamental to effective cross-cultural communication and
interaction. These areas are Emotional Resilience, Flexibility/Openness, Perceptual Acuity, and
Personal Autonomy (Meyers, 2016). The CCAI is based on a total of 653 male and female
participants from varied cultures and occupational fields.
Cultural Intelligence (CQ)
This research employs the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) based on the principle of
cultural intelligence (CQ). Cultural intelligence was chosen over the other alternatives due to its
limited exposure in previous military research and the fact that as of December 2016 the CQS is
based on a large database of over 58,000 participants representing 98 countries (Cultural
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Intelligence Center, 2016). The researcher attended a CQ certification course in Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, and achieved certification in CQ Levels I and II, which allowed the researcher
the ability to process results and to provide feedback and counseling to participants. These
factors contributed to the final decision to use CQ as the primary tool to measure the sample
groups.
Livermore (2015) provides a founding principle of cultural intelligence by proposing that
culture is not a thing but rather a fluid concept with complicated moving parts that require an
endless amount of effort to allow for success in any cross-cultural settings. Further, there are
many concepts that suggest what best determines positive cross-cultural outcomes. The guiding
theme throughout CQ is to assist individuals in self-awareness first, followed by the development
of a working, cross-cultural interaction plan (Livermore, 2015). Cultural Intelligence starts where
the client is, and involves a measurement tool to capture this beginning point, to gain an
understanding of the participant’s current cross-cultural personal awareness level. More
importantly, this is the stage that offers an opportunity to examine the individual’s potential for
motivation, which is the key to CQ success and to any other cross-cultural education.
Motivation is key, for without it no forward movement can begin. It is important to assess this in
the beginning and if there is a lack of motivation it needs to be addressed, for until an
individual’s lack of motivation is corrected, little can be accomplished in the realm of crosscultural competency (Livermore, 2016).
The significance of the words “cultural intelligence” may present a distinct difference
between how the originators of CQ, Earley and Ang (2003), understood it and how the military
community interprets these words. The words cultural and intelligence alone contain a wide
range of definitions and no matter whether used in the civilian or in the military community, both
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words, independently used or strung together, clearly elicit different meanings. It is important
that the reader understands the intended meaning of cultural intelligence (CQ) represented
herein.
Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is directly linked to Earley’s and Ang’s (2003) development to
define what forces drive cross-cultural interaction in the realm of the global community. At the
end of the 20th century the majority of people working in cross-cultural environments were
limited in number and mostly expatriates (Aizpourm, Ebrahimi, & Alipoor, 2013). As the 21st
century emerged, the world faced burgeoning globalization and, for the first time, global citizens
were exposed to or had the potential to engage in cross-cultural interactions from their living
rooms. This globalization virtually opened the business community to a global market place,
which had not previously been possible (Quelch & Klein, 1996).
The selection of CQ as a measurement tool in this research is due to its ability to utilize
century-old research and adapt it to a practical realism that is useful in present business and
military settings. Cultural Intelligence is a relatively new methodology used to identify areas
critical for success in cross-cultural settings. Earley and Ang (2003) approached CQ by blending
accepted models of proven assessment methods of an individual’s aptitude, and they asked what
other possibilities existed to ensure cross-cultural success. Little work has been accomplished
using CQ in the military. Further, the four defining areas outlined by Van Dyne et al. (2015) of
strategy, knowledge, motivation, and behavior seemed to offer a logical correlation with the
military and its training programs.
Understanding cultural intelligence. The concept of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is
relatively new, but based on more than 100 years of empirical data. Cultural intelligence was
introduced by Earley and Ang (2003), who approached the issue of how to better prepare
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individual interactions in cross-culture settings. Others such as David Livermore (2015) have
continued to expand and add to the research. The assumption behind the concept is that CQ can
be measured on a scale in much the same way as IQ (Intelligence Quotient) and EQ (Emotional
Intelligence). Simply put, CQ “refers to a person’s capacity to adapt to new cultural settings
based on multiple facets, including cognitive, motivational, and behavioral features” (Earley,
2002, p. 271). Cultural intelligence is driven by the theme of assisting individuals in selfawareness, followed by the development of a working, cross-cultural interaction plan
(Livermore, 2015).
An individual’s capacity for culturally effective behavior is first highlighted with an
assessment of one’s level of motivation. Motivation is important and viewed as the key to
successful outcomes in cross-cultural education, for without motivation, little can move forward,
as pure cognitive factors do not guarantee success in CQ or other measurable quotations such as
IQ. An individual with a high IQ may not perform well academically without the necessary level
of motivation. By the same token, without motivation, it would be impossible for an individual
to reach his or her potential in cross-cultural competency (Livermore, 2016).
As Earley and Ang (2003) argued, CQ is directly linked to the forces driving crosscultural interaction within the global community. During most of the twentieth century, the
number of people working in cross-cultural environments was limited to expatriates (Aizpourm,
Ebrahimi, & Alipoor, 2013). In the twenty-first century, the forces of globalization, which
certainly had existed in the closing years of the previous century, became more powerful. For
the first time, global citizenship was relevant and opened the business community to the global
marketplace in a way that had not been possible previously (Quelch & Klein, 1996). Coupled

35
with the demands of a global war on terror, cultural intelligence has become necessary for
survival and success in the twenty-first century.
Background of cultural intelligence. A century of research assumed that general
intelligence (IQ) would be the leading and most relevant factor to function successfully in a
cross-cultural environment. Since it was well known that a high IQ was an accurate predictor of
academic success, a logical assumption would be that a high IQ would be a predictor of high
emotional intelligence (EQ) and social intelligence (SQ) (Moon, 2010). General intelligence,
emotional intelligence, and social intelligence were the assumed factors that would determine
one’s ability to function in a cross-cultural environment (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006).
Simply put, an individual would prove more successful in a cross-cultural setting if he or she met
the requirements of high general, emotional, and social intelligence than one who did not possess
those same characteristics (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006).
Earley and Ang (2003) broke new ground by suggesting that CQ in itself was a form of
intelligence and, more importantly, CQ provided a new approach to success in cross-cultural
settings different from what had been previously identified. Their work added new research and
concepts offered a new approach for the academic and research community to expand on
previous beliefs that relied heavily on the traditional and accepted quotations.
For years, researchers at the Nanyang University in Singapore, led by Earley and Ang,
had been searching for a modern approach that would address the difficult issues facing business
leaders in cross-cultural settings. They focused on those qualities they knew prepared
individuals for success in various cross-cultural environments and consequently generated a
theory they believe applies in any cross-cultural situation (Earley & Ang, 2003). This research
reshaped the conversation on cross-cultural success from being culture-specific, to a set of ideas
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relevant to any cultural setting. Cross-cultural success is not the consequence of knowing how to
operate in a specific culture, rather it is an individual’s perception of that culture and the use of a
method to adapt and respond to specific situations in any culture that determine one’s success or
failure (Livermore, 2015).
Earley and Ang’s (2003) initial work established CQ as a legitimate field of study in the
social sciences, as experts continue to seek the appropriate way to approach the global, crosscultural community that has emerged over the past twenty years (Livermore, 2010). Although
some may argue that cultural intelligence is not a relevant concept for everyone, it is important to
understand that CQ is not a fad or new idea, it is based on decades of accepted social science
research.
The specifics of cultural intelligence. Cultural Intelligence is one of several currently
understood aspects of human intelligence, including general intelligence (IQ), social intelligence
(SQ), and emotional intelligence (EQ) and is conceptualized in four distinct levels of
understanding (Earley & Ang, 2003). The four areas on which CQ focuses are based on
metacognitive, cognitive, motivation, and behavior factors (Earley and Ang, 2003). Earley, Ang
and Tan (2006) define these four areas as:
1. Metacognitive CQ reflects an individual’s personal cultural awareness and his or
her ability to maintain that level of conscious understanding in cross-culture
interactions (Earley et al., 2006). Individuals that are aware of their cross-culture
environments make positive adjustments in their interactions with others (Ang &
Van Dyne, 2008).
2. Cognitive CQ reflects an individual’s general knowledge of culture based on
factors that have been learned from education and personal experiences (Ang &
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Van Dyne, 2008), thus reflecting the extent of an individual’s understanding of
the ways cultures are the same and the ways cultures differ. This includes other
preconceived positive and negative concepts of culture.
3. Motivational CQ reflects an individual’s interest and confidence in creating a
successful cross-culture interaction. Even someone who has a firm grasp of a
specific culture may not perform well without motivation. (Ang & Van Dyne,
2008)
4. Behavioral CQ reflects an individual’s capacity to use appropriate verbal and
nonverbal behavior in various cultural settings. Ang and Van Dyne (2008)
describe this as one’s ability to control and adjust behavior to meet the culture
needs of any given situation. (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008)
These four areas are critical to CQ and show how Earley and Ang’s (2003) ideas changed
previous thinking about the sources of effectiveness in cross-cultural interactions. Kirkman,
Lowe, and Gibson (2006) agree that CQ dispels some of the previous arguments that placed
more weight on traditional forms of intelligence and argue that previous interpretations may
require adjustments based on Earley and Ang’s research. Their work suggests that motivation
and behavior components are critical to success in navigating cross-culture seas.
Individual success through cultural intelligence. Many factors contribute to one’s
success in cross-cultural environments, including the individual’s level of acceptance and a
personal awareness of cross-cultural situations. Hernandez and Blazer (2006) suggest that an
individual’s competency is demonstrated through attitude, view of the world, geographical
location, and is influenced by parents, gender, race, and social-economic class. Lewis (2011)
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argues that an individual relies on various cognitive factors that place a high value on an
individual’s preconceived concepts of culture and regional norms.
To build on the previous statement, perception is many times a reality, and without
education, motivation, and behavioral change, nothing will change that perception. Motivation
and behavior modification are the foundation for effective cross-cultural performance.
Consequently, Livermore (2015) argues against the idea that an introverted person would be less
effective in cross-cultural interactions than would an extroverted person. Since motivation is a
primary factor in such interactions, a motivated introvert would potentially be as successful as an
extrovert in a cross-cultural environment (Livermore, 2011).
Research on cultural intelligence has demonstrated that effective cross-cultural
interaction depends less on an individual’s knowledge and experience with a specific culture
than on his or her perception of culture in general and on his or her method of adapting and
responding to immediate situations, regardless of the specific culture involved (Livermore,
2015). Livermore (2015) goes on to stress the importance of high levels of individual motivation
and the ability to adjust behavior as the key to success, rather than simply relying on past
experiences or training.
The Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS)
Given the importance of cultural intelligence as established by the research reviewed
above, the challenge then was to address ways of improving an individual’s level of crosscultural effectiveness. The logical starting point for such efforts would be to develop a method
of measuring an individual’s current level of CQ. Such a method could also be used as a
screening device to identify individuals with high potential for cross-cultural effectiveness.
Consequently, this need led to the development of the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS), a
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twenty-item personal assessment tool based on the research on cultural intelligence (Ang & Van
Dyne, 2008). Using the CQS, the Cultural Intelligence Center, located in Holt, Minnesota, as of
the conclusion of 2016 has collected results from over 58,000 individuals representing 98
countries, which are used to identify an individual’s CQ level (Livermore, 2015).
To be clear, the CQS does not provide an exact CQ score. Rather, it provides a ranking
or percentage measured among the results of others who have completed the four measured areas
of CQ: metacognition, cognition, motivation, and behavior. The development of the CQS
proceeded through six phases that examined possibilities and variants perceived by the
researchers (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). The six phases were scale development, generalizability
across samples, generalizability across time, generalizability across countries, generalizability
across methods, and discriminant and incremental validity. The studies conducted during each
of these phases confirmed that the CQS was a legitimate method of measuring an individual’s
capacity for intercultural interaction without previous understanding of the exact culture to which
one is exposed (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008).
The CQS breaks down the four areas of metacognitive, cognitive, motivation, and
behavior under four new headings that correlate with the same order previously mentioned: CQ
drive, CQ knowledge, CQ action, and CQ strategy. The participants are rated on each question
on a low, moderate, and high scale. A low rating places the respondent in the bottom 25 percent,
moderate in the middle 50 percent, and high in the top 25 percent (Cultural Intelligence Center,
2016).
The CQS self-assessment provides a score and a detailed report that uncovers subcategories within each of the four dimensions. The score may improve over time and is not fixed
to the initial test results (Van Dyne et al., 2015). Most participants find it beneficial to read the
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feedback report once and re-read it again in a few days to reflect on the feedback and process
how information can be best utilized (Cultural Intelligence Center, 2016). The importance of the
individual’s understanding of his or her personal values and norms is a valid first step in the
journey toward improved cross-cultural interactions. With CQ education, there is great
flexibility for improvement once the individual understands the process. Once accepted, the next
steps allow for an individual to continue to a higher level of CQ.
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Part II

Figure 5. Photo taken by U.S. Army Sergeant Scott J. Tant of a U.S. Army female
soldier holding the hand of an Afghanistan young girl in April 2010, somewhere
in Afghanistan.
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The Role of Cross-Cultural Competency Role in the Military
This section will focus on the Department of Defense (DoD) general response to
addressing cross-cultural competency, with detailed examination of smaller elite units such as
the United States Marine Corps, confronted with a multitude of challenging missions that have a
high potential for cross-cultural engagements. Additionally, an examination of the Special
Operation Force community offers a unique way of understanding the face of front line crosscultural interactions.
The concept of cross-cultural effectiveness is of great importance to the military,
particularly to military leadership as it attempts to overcome numerous cross-cultural challenges.
In recent years, cultural training has attempted to provide more control to the war fighter in the
turbulent, multi-cultural arena in the hope of producing a more effective, culturally intelligent
warrior on the battlefield (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008). This collaboration between military
leadership and scholarly research continues to facilitate the warrior’s evolution and to identify a
modern approach to cultural awareness (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008). This individual
approach may allow the concept of cross-cultural competence to strengthen the military’s
cultural competency training, with less focus on the more traditional individual warrior’s
preparation.
Brawn -vs.- Brains Approach
Understandably, the military has the natural tendency to focus more on the hardware of
war than on the mental and intellectual capacities of its warriors, which often comes as an
afterthought in the preparation for conflict (Gallus et al., 2014). The Department of Defense’s
lack of preparedness in providing meaningful cultural understanding and training became
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apparent with the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, a deficiency that became even more
apparent as the focus shifted from that country to Iraq.
By 2003, with a growing concern for failed policy and operational procedures, the need
to address the culture gap had become clear. As a response, the Department of Defense initiated
a study directing each military department Combat Command (COCOM), to join the Defense
Agency in a review of the current requirements for language professionals, interpreters,
translators, crypto-linguists, interrogators, and area specialists; a review that was to include
enlisted men and women, officers, and civilian personnel (DoD, 2005, p. 1). The study covered
post 9/11 activities through August 31, 2004 and became known as the Defense Language
Transformational Roadmap (DoD, 2005). The document, published in January 2005, made the
following four assumptions:
What is clear is that conflicts against enemies speaking less-commonly-taught languages
will increase, thus the need for foreign language capability will not abate. Robust foreign
language and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional
stability, and conducting multi-national missions, especially in post-conflict and other than
combat, security, humanitarian, nation-building, and stability operations.
Changes in the international security environment and threats to U.S. national security
have increased the range of potential conflict zones and have expanded the number of likely
coalition partners with whom U.S. forces will work. Establishing a new “global footprint” for
DoD, and transitioning to a more expeditionary force, will bring increased requirements for
culture and regional foreign language capabilities beyond those generally available in today’s
force. For more than a decade, the world observed how adversaries use cross-cultural mistakes
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in the media to leverage sympathetic elements of the population and political opposition to
divide international coalitions (DoD, 2005, p.3).
While credit may be given to the DoD, the military, and the academic professionals who
compiled the information on which the report is based, attention is drawn to the fact that DoD
remains without a service-wide plan to assess service members’ cultural competencies. In fact,
academic military scholars admit the use of a broad range of cross-cultural competency tools that
are inconsistent with different branches of the Department of Defense (Gallus et al., 2014).
Alarmingly, social scientists have commented that the lack of agreement on a single standardized
tool to measure the cultural competency of service members, has had a wide range of
consequences, from a failure to fully utilize highly functioning service members to the
identification of those who pose a danger to their respective units (Gallus et al., 2014).
The Human Terrain System Experiment: “Good Initiative, Bad Judgment”
The Human Terrain System (HTS) was a program introduced into the United States
Army to help commanders understand the cultural context (i.e., the “human terrain”) of the war
on terror. Initially based on an article by McFate and Jackson (2005), the HTS was a bold
approach to the growing need of military commanders and troops to understand the enemy and
the culture in which they were operating, by introducing numerous academics from the social
science field, most being PhD anthropologists. These scientists were eventually seen by their
community as intelligence assets for the military, which caused this social-science-meetsmilitary experiment to be viewed in an extremely negative context by the social science
community (Evans, 2015).
The Human Terrain System began in 2007 with a pilot test that sent five HTS trained
teams to Iraq and Afghanistan (McFate and Jackson, 2005). Initially the program was funded for
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two years with a budget of twenty million dollars. From that modest beginning, at its height the
program involved 31 teams and an annual budget of one hundred and fifty million dollars
(McFate and Jackson, 2005). As the American involvement in Afghanistan gradually drew
down, the program was accordingly reduced. By the end of 2014, no HTS trained teams
remained in the country, which essentially ended the program (McFate and Jackson, 2005).
During a press conference several months before the program ended formally, the
Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, praised the initiative as a forward-thinking program that
addressed the age-old battle of winning hearts and minds. Secretary McHugh went on to argue
that the information the teams provided was what he referred to as “actionable and useful for
decision-making” (Vanden Brook, 2015, para. 5).
During its eight years of existence, the HTS received considerable praise from military
leadership and criticism from the social science community. David Rohde, a Pulitzer Prize
winning journalist reported in a 2007 article in the New York Times that officers in Afghanistan
reported that the HTS teams had helped “them see the situation from an Afghan perspective and
allowed them to cut back on combat operations” (Rohde, 2007, para. 12). While another
commander simply stated, “Call it what you want, it works. . . . It works in helping you define
the problems, not just the symptoms” (Rohde, 2007, para 15).
The major criticism however, came from the American Anthropological Association,
which was concerned with the ethical dilemma that participation by social scientists provided the
kind of assistance to the military that would alter the culture the anthropologists were studying—
a major violation of the association’s code of ethics. Allegations were made that the information
the scientists were providing the military was altering the very culture they were hired to advise
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on (Evans, 2015). This was a violation of the code to do no harm to the culture in which one is
working and it created an immediate ethical dilemma (Connable, 2009).
Numerous studies have been conducted on the HTS initiative and listed in detail the
various problems encountered by the program. However, every study conducted on the program
to date acknowledged that a majority of the commanders in the field were very positive about the
work of the human terrain teams and were supportive of their efforts (Lamb, Orton, Davies &
Pikulsky, 2013).
The Army’s Human Terrain System can be viewed as a grand experiment in cultural
intelligence, but with its excessive cost and the drawdown from Afghanistan, the program was
allowed to expire (Evans, 2015). Despite its mixed success, the Department of Defense (DoD)
clearly understands the need for cross-culture competence assessment and training. As evidence
of this understanding, Jessica Gallus and her colleagues published an extensive annotated
bibliography in 2014. The abstract of this bibliography establishes the importance of crosscultural understanding in today’s military.
Given the current operational context, research both inside and outside the DoD has
increasingly focused its efforts on better understanding the factors that contribute to effective
cross-cultural performance. Of interest is the role cross-cultural competence (3C) plays in
servicemembers’ ability to navigate cultural environments, as well as the specific knowledge,
skills, and abilities that military training should be targeting to improve performance-related
outcomes. Over the past ten years, numerous studies and theoretical pieces have been developed
that explore these issues as they relate to both military and general populations. This annotated
bibliography represents an initial attempt to gather this collection of work into a single,
comprehensive review to be used as a reference for those conducting research in this domain.
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Annotations hail from several different disciplines, including military psychology,
organizational psychology, anthropology, and sociology, and range in content from theoretical to
empirical studies, efforts at model building and computer technologies for understanding, and
various methods for teaching and assessing 3C (Gallus et al., 2014). Clearly, the military has
come to understand that cross-cultural competency is a key factor in determining an individual’s
readiness and fitness for deployment, as well the crucial need to identify at-risk service members
with limited cultural understanding (Gallus et al., 2014).
The United States Marine Corps and Approach to Cross-Cultural Awareness
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has been examined extensively in the research
of cross-cultural competency. The Corps is a small, elite unit with a highly structured system
that places great emphasis on self-awareness, discipline, and motivation. Moreover, the Marine
Corps has fought in some of the most difficult areas in Afghanistan and Iraq, while at the same
time it was tasked to perform peacekeeping and humanitarian missions around the globe and had
consequently been thrust into varied cross-cultural environments (Holmes-Eber, 2014). Because
the focus of this study is Special Forces, this review of the literature places emphasis on research
directed at Marine operations.
The United States Marine Corps is a leader in understanding the need for an improved
approach to cross-cultural interaction and has attempted to educate and prepare Marines for
battle in modern irregular war fighting (Healey, 2008). The Marine Corps has placed
considerable emphasis on cultural awareness operational readiness, evidenced by the
establishment in 2006 of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). The
CAOCL created a Program of Instruction (POI) to teach Marines the basics of effective crosscultural performance (MacMillan, Walker, Clarke & Mark, 2013). However, per Healy (2012),
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prior to the establishment of the CAOCL, the USMC’s approach to training was virtually
nonexistent. As he states, “throughout the USMC’s 200-year history a blatant neglect to train
Marines to be culturally aware was the status quo” (Healey, 2012, p. 11). This neglect highlights
the critical need for cross-cultural training as the Corps faces the demands of a global war on
terror.
A better-late-than-never response to the lack of cultural training was addressed by the
Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). In 2008, the USMC published
Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber’s book titled Operational Culture for the Warfighter:
Principles and Application that highlighted the need for Marines to incorporate culture and
cultural differences in mission planning and identified five cultural dimensions for Marines to
consider when planning missions:
Dimension 1, the physical environment. The way that a cultural group determines the
use of the physical environment, including who has access to important physical resources
(water, land, food, building materials, etc.) and how the culture views these resources (e.g., land
is owned or free to everyone).
Dimension 2, the economy. The way that people in a culture obtain, produce, and
distribute physical and symbolic goods (whether food, clothing, cars, or cowrie shells).
Dimension 3, the social structure. How people organize their political, economic, and
social relationships, and the way this organization influences the distribution of positions, roles,
status, and power within culture groups.
Dimension 4, the political structure. The political structures of a culture group and the
unique forms of leadership within such structures (bands, acephalous societies, councils,
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hereditary chiefdoms and tribal structures, electoral political systems, etc.). The distinction
between formal, ideal political structures versus actual power structures.
Dimension 5, beliefs and symbols. The cultural beliefs that influence a person's
worldview; and the rituals, symbols, and practices associated with a belief system. These include
the role of local belief systems and religions in controlling and affecting behavior (Salmoni &
Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 25).
The researchers made observations similar to those made by Healy (2012) regarding the
lack of cultural tolerance among the Corps; however, in the early days of the war on terror this
deficit was not openly discussed or even seen as a negative. This denial is characteristic of an
attitude commonly witnessed in combat areas, especially those of the Special Operations Forces
(SOF) and it remains a topic that is taboo even today (Shanker & Oppel Jr., 2014).
Despite the historical disregard for cultural issues, when compared to other branches of
the U.S. military, the United States Marine Corps has participated in their own cultural
awareness training through a concentrated approach and strong focused leadership that
understands the importance of culture and its role on the modern battlefield. Despite the Corps’
efforts however, little attention has been paid to the cross-cultural awareness of the lowest
echelon of enlisted men and women. Yet such awareness is crucially important, for it is these
individuals, many of whom are in their late teens, who are required to make life and death
decisions with minimal supervision, all while under the inconceivable stress the battlefield
delivers (Kelly & Holmes-Eber, 2010).
Arguably the Marine’s enlisted personnel go without adequate training while junior
officers receive CQ training at the Marine Corps University (MCU) at Quantico, Virginia. The
training offers them tools to prepare for the unique demands of a cross-cultural combat
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environment. If only one officer is charged with leading several junior Marines, an argument
can be made that this type of training benefits all Marines (Kelly & Holmes-Eber, 2010), a
dubious argument at best.
David Livermore (2015) defends the need for individual preparation and contends that
cultural intelligence (CQ) provides the individual the ability to understand, through personal
awareness, an essential step in the process of increasing one’s level of CQ. For without
identifying individual values and norms, it would seem impossible to develop a solid strategy to
gain success in a cross-cultural situation.
While there has been some effort toward addressing the importance of cultural
understanding, many important issues remain insufficiently addressed by the U.S. Marine Corps.
The military and the Marines may not know where the next armed conflict may take place.
Although preparing every Marine for any given culture is arguably an impossible task and may
be a valid concern, cultural intelligence training does address this concern, as CQ is not
culturally specific. Cultural Intelligence ideally permits an individual to move more easily
between cultures, although further research is needed to assess the full benefits of how CQ works
for individuals in different cultures, particularly within the military (Rockstuhl et al., 2010).
The Marine Corps Expeditionary Design
The Marine Corps falls under the Department of the Navy and was officially established
November 10, 1775. It is composed of three divisions of Marines: the 1st Division based at
Camp Pendleton, California; the 2nd Division based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and the
3rd Division based on the island of Okinawa, Japan. These divisions are strategically located
and show their amphibious heritage by holding beachfront property for training in all three
locations. In peacetime two to three Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Capable
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(MEUSOC) are operational and consist of 2,200 sailors and Marines deployed aboard selfsufficient, amphibious ships known as the Gator Fleet. The ships are deployed around the world
ready to direct their resources on objectives when ordered by the President or by Congress.
The MEUSOC can fight for fifteen days without additional support and can operate under
four major tasks that coincide with the meaning of MEUSOC (Marine Corps, 1994). This
provides the Commander in Chief a “Force in Readiness,” a term the Marine Corps adopted as
America’s international 911 force.
•

Amphibious assault, raid and withdraw (Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2006)

•

Direct Action Operations, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft, and Security Operations
(Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2006, p. 3)

•

Operations other than war that include Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

•

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2006, p. 3).

The Marine Corps' three-block war concept. The former Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General Charles Krulak, proposed that the Corps require the capability to fight a threeblock war, which seemed appropriate at the end of the 20th century (Dorn & Varey, 2009, p. 38).
The three-block concept is based on three situations the Marines may face within three blocks of
any city in the same day or vis-à-vis a type of Black Hawk Down scenario. Dorn and Varey
(2009) describe the concept as follows; in the first block, Marines may be ordered to assist in the
distribution of food and aid to refugees in a humanitarian mission. The next block may find the
Marines attempting to maintain peace between two warring factions. Lastly, the third block
depicts the Marines fighting in a highly lethal, mid-to-high-intensity battle.
General Mattis and Hoffman (2005) built on the three-block war principle and
subsequently considered the existence of a fourth element, the realization that human beings are
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part of each block. This constitutes a significant factor in mission accomplishment; managing
the human terrain element is crucial in any situation the three-block concept may provide.
General Mattis understood cultural understanding as a meaningful part of the overall strategy for
successful fighting in Iraq. He saw the Marines as the sensors as well as the transmitters in
communication and intelligence gathering (Mattis & Hoffman, 2006). The concept of the fourth
block has continued to evolve, along with other attempts to gain a cross-cultural advantage.
Today, the fourth block element is better known throughout the Department of Defense as CrossCultural Competency (Gallus et al., 2014).
Prior to September 11, 2001, the final decades of the twentieth century bore witness to a
transition from conventional warfare, known to Marine leadership as the Amphibious Doctrine,
to more low intensity conflicts with scenarios such as those found in Granada, Panama, and
Somalia. As the Corps transitioned to more precise, close contact scenarios involving foreign
nationals, the potential increased for more exposure to cross-cultural situations. Consequently,
training was required to meet these challenges, allowing the Marine Corps to increase its
usefulness as the country’s niche fighting unit to not only the Department of Defense and the
Commander in Chief but also to the United States Department of State (DOS). In this capacity,
The Corps is considered as an extension of the DOS to spread its influence while shaping foreign
policy by use of this “Force in Readiness.” Such uses range from combating terrorism, to
international peacekeeping, to humanitarian assistance, and to training of foreign militaries (Boot
& Kirkpatrick, 2006).
In the execution of foreign policy, the United States uses two basic strategies in its use of
the military. First, the simple exhibition of power aims to prevent violence through an
unmatched show of military force that causes the enemy to halt its posturing or to withdraw its
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forces. If force is deemed necessary, a second approach uses coordinated attacks to neutralize
the enemy swiftly, while limiting the mortality of allied forces and unarmed citizens. Such
missions are generally achieved on foreign soil within a cultural terrain markedly dissimilar to
that of the United States.
Historically, Marine Corps training has focused on providing its members with the
world’s most technologically advanced military equipment and developing the most advanced
training systems for the use of that equipment. Yet, while technology has evolved, training
philosophies have fallen short, as is documented here (Healey, 2012). Specifically, questions
arise as to whether current Marine training fails to prepare its fighters to navigate the cultural
terrain of the battlefield and whether, as an organization, the Corps is interested in reducing
injuries and deaths of its own forces, its allies, and the lives of non-combatants.
Military and academic institutions describe modern conflicts as involving
“unconventional warfare,” “irregular warfare,” and “asymmetrical warfare,” terms used
throughout this research. In short, most of the modern conflicts in which the USMC participates
involve an enemy unlike any other encountered before. This enemy is one with far fewer
resources and training than the Corps and may or may not be part of a proxy war sponsored by a
nation-state. The enemy may engage in an urban operational environment and attempt to
achieve victory not through the complete destruction of the opposing military’s forces, but
through the age-old unconventional warfare concept of achieving victory through acquiescence,
capitulation, or clandestine support (Korb & Bergmann, 2008).
Over the past fourteen years, much of the USMC combat activity consisted of fighting a
two-war campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq. The efforts in Afghanistan continued through 2016
in nearly the same battlefield faced shortly after September 11, 2001. The enemy has proved to
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be a worthy adversary to the extent that the Taliban has shockingly assumed a legitimate place at
the political table, a feat that was unimaginable in 2001. Military leadership and scholars have
concluded that to improve the military’s effectiveness, the Corps must better navigate the
cultural terrain of the operational environments it faces (Eber-Holmes, 2014). Fittingly, the
mission to create a culturally adroit warrior has become an inherent responsibility for military
leadership (Hajjar, 2010).
Different types of cultural awareness training have always been a part of the military
culture; however, cross-cultural competency is an area that failed to truly gain the attention of
leadership prior to the military being turned into an accompanying force in Afghanistan and
more noticeably in Iraq. Insurgency forced leadership to take notice of cross-cultural challenges
facing the military. However, just being aware is not enough, especially in the situation the
military leadership found itself as it was losing the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. Livermore
(2010) argues that simple cultural awareness is not sufficient to alter behavior and fails to
determine one’s cross-cultural success.
Implementing Cross-Cultural Competency in the Military
The DoD has defined the Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Other characteristics
(KSAOs) necessary for cross-cultural success. First, a body of knowledge or information exists
that an individual may already hold and or learn. Second, certain skills can be identified that
may enhance individual performance in cross-cultural environments. Third, certain abilities are
necessary to effectively engage in cross-cultural interactions. Finally, other characteristics that
are important for cross-cultural success include, but are not limited to, personal background,
language, religion, motivation, and world-view (Gallus et al., 2014). Other studies in Cultural
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Intelligence (CQ) that closely follow these KSAOs may be used to assist DoD to establish a
foundation for cross-cultural training.
Areas for Concern with the Future of Cross-Cultural Competency
Given the varied cultures and terrains faced by the military, a formula for success was
needed that included more than hardware. This need has resulted in an increased awareness of
the need for culturally sensitive, effective warriors. This competency can essentially be viewed
as a means to win the hearts and minds of the civilian population. In addition, such
competencies can offer a Special Operations Forces member the opportunity to not only act in
his or her natural warrior capability but also in a scholarly or diplomatic manner (Spencer, 2010).
Admittedly, this is not a natural skill set for most conventional or non-conventional military
personnel.
While the Marine Corps and other military units expect its men and women to operate
appropriately in non-combatant situations, the underlying, fundamental thinking of the military is
simply to kill the enemy. A prime example may be viewed through the lens of the Marine
Corps’ stated mission for an infantry rifle squad, which is to “locate, close with and destroy the
enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat” (United States
Marine Corps, 2015). Nonetheless, despite this inherently violent mission, there has been a
growing understanding that in fighting a war, the modern warrior must demonstrate the attributes
of cultural intelligence to be fully successful on today’s battlefields. More than ever, American
troops are expected to provide the killing attributes of former warriors, while combining that
skill with the ability to be diplomatic about it. Military experts Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, and Smith
(2010) offer that,
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Conducting military operations in low-intensity conflict areas without
ethnographic and cultural intelligence is akin to building a house without using
thumbs: although possible, it is a wasteful, clumsy, and unnecessarily slow
process at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure. Unfortunately,
while such waste on a building site means merely loss of time and materials,
waste on the battlefield means loss of life—both civilian and military—with high
potential for failure having grave geopolitical consequences to the loser. (Spencer,
2010, Kindle location 909).
To further expand on the importance of addressing these concerns with a better plan is
supported through the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, which states that,
Human reactions cannot be reduced to exact science, but there are certain
principles that should guide our conduct. . . Psychological errors may be
committed which antagonize the population of a country occupied and all the
foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching effect and it may
require a long period to re-establish confidence, respect, and order. (Spencer,
2010, Kindle location 909).
Spencer (2010) examines the ethical considerations of employing CQ and discusses it as
a positive method for the military to prepare their nation’s men and women, who are sent into
harm’s way, to act accordingly. “The meaning of war for many may appear silly or even
barbaric in nature but it is no different from a schoolyard fight in its intent” (Location 1882).
According to Spencer (2010), the intent is to get your enemy to submit to your will: “the
enduring nature of war is that, within the strategic arena of conflict, we and our enemy are both
striving to be able to destroy the other” (Location 1882). Unfortunately, both sides in any
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conflict are almost certain to see their cause and themselves as righteous. Yet as the war on
terrorism continues, the civilian population caught in the middle of that war see little
righteousness on either side, as the continued war presents them nothing but evil conclusions
(Spencer, 2010).
Self and peer evaluations. One of the areas discussed in the Department of Defense
(DoD) annotated bibliography presented by Gallus et al. (2014), is the question of self-report
measurement scales. Although the study was not directed at the CQS or CQ in general, concern
was expressed for the accuracy of any self-rating survey. It is well known that the inclusion of
peer testing enhances the overall usefulness of self-reports. While research has been conducted
for over twelve years with assessment tools such as the CQS, Multicultural Personality
Questionnaire (MPQ), the Interpersonal Development Inventory, and the Cross-Cultural
Competence Assessment Tool (Gallus et al., 2014), concern exists that these assessments rely
solely on the individual assessment through their own ratings, which will present bias, such as
social bias, by the participant. Although the Gallus et al. (2014) report made clear the need for a
balance of peer and individual surveys, it was not clear why the Gallus et al. (2014) DoD
publication excluded the use of peer reviews.
Better results through peer and self-assessment. The Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS)
should be considered a starting point in developing an individual’s level of cross-cultural
competency. The need to perform peer- and self-assessments rests in the reality that selfassessments alone are usually not enough to develop a personal awareness strategy. There are
proven examples where there is tendency for some of the worst performers to rate themselves
higher in cross-cultural competency than is merited by their actions (Gallus et al., 2014).
Through the researcher’s knowledge, there is one confirmed case of this in the research study.
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Previous research provides evidence of this type of response with a military research study that
discovered this descrepancy through the differences of United States military officers and their
host Foreign Service Nationals (FSN) as cited in this literature review.
The study focused on several United States military officers stationed in Egypt who
served as Security Assistance Officers (SAOs), whose mission was to interact in cross-cultural
environments as direct representatives of the United States military and Department of State
(Braziel, 2011). Based on their thorough training in the Arabic language and culture preparation,
the SAOs thought they understood fully the host culture and believed they presented a positive
example to their hosts. Unfortunately, their Egyptian FSN counterparts did not make these same
observations. As the study concludes, the overwhelming amount of evidence . . . gave a strong
indication that the FSNs perceived the SAOs as not fully possessing an adequate level of crosscultural competency. . . . The FSNs were asked to provide their thoughts about the leadership
capabilities of SAOs. Examples of the FSNs’ negative perceptions of the SAOs’ cross-cultural
competency included statements such as “military leaders . . . do not have the whole picture,”
“military members really do not know much about leading Egyptians,” and “most of them [the
SAOs] were not properly taught about Egyptian culture,” and “disappointment” (Braziel, 2011,
p. 160).
Braziel’s (2011) study was driven by the hypothesis that military service members would
successfully use CQ due to the presumption that every military officer holds a reasonable amount
of measured discipline and motivation as, presumably, they are motivated and in control of their
behavior. While the research demonstrated that some of these key traits, such as self-motivation
and drive did exist, they were not automatically a guarantee for success. Whereas the military
personnel scored high in areas of self-management, confidence, and self-identity ratings, they
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scored lower in areas related to tolerance of ambiguity. This included social flexibility, selfawareness, and emotional sensitivity, factors that do not align very well with the skill sets
required for effective CQ (Braziel, 2011). Simply put, these highly trained and motivated
officers did not, overall, prove themselves to be culturally intelligent.
What becomes clear from the literature on cultural intelligence and is agreed upon
throughout the social science community is the importance of understanding the process of world
globalization and the need to manage its evolution (Livermore, 2015). CQ research defines how
humans may successfully interact in cross-cultural settings with little to no preparation for that
specific culture (Livermore, 2015). Further, cultural intelligence (CQ) argues that anyone may
be successful in a cultural setting with the appropriate training. As a business tool, the Cultural
Intelligence Scale (CQS) may be used to quickly define who will be most accomplished in an
emerging arena where success is demanded (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). And while CQ is geared
to the business community, there currently exists no data to indicate this business model should
not be used within the military arena.
Balancing cross-cultural competency with combat. Dehumanization of the enemy is a
fundamental method of preparing military service members for combat. To ensure success on
the battlefield, the military requires its warriors to de-humanize the enemy, to see things clearly
in a “you versus them” scenario—kill them or they will kill you. However, French (2005) argues
that the reality of combat is rarely that black and white and that many difficult choices are made
in deciding whom to kill. Arguably, there is much gray area involved on the battlefields of the
Twenty-first Century and uncertainties that demand careful attention, which should be an
integral component of cross-culturally sensitive warfare.
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One major concern plaguing the military over the past decade as a by-product of multiple
hostile deployments, especially concerning the Special Operations Commands, is prolonged
exposure to a high state of stress without a mechanism for purging the combat mindset. This
drains the servicemembers’ psyches and is argued to be a contributing factor too much negative
behavior within the Special Operation Forces (SOF) community (Glicken-Turnley, 2011). An
examination of how other cultures traditionally deal with a warrior’s return from combat and
how the public regards these veterans and the striking difference between the attitudes
characteristic of the war on terror (French, 2005). With a new report about the Navy’s elite
commando unit that surfaced in early 2017, about members of SEAL Team VI involving a
culture in which war crimes were not only tolerated but encouraged in some cases (Quinn &
Zilber, 2017).
The members of Seal Team VI were facing multiple deployments, up to 17 back to back.
Additionally, these men witnessed gruesome and frequent combat, including the beheading of
one of their teammates in Afghanistan. This set into motion an untamed retaliation exercise by
some SEAL team members (Quinn & Zilber, 2017). These high stress conditions, combined
with leadership dismissing questionable and at times criminal offenses, created a setting that
would evolve into encouraging rogue behavior. In what was referred to by some as war
pornography, team members were introduced to bleed-out and death videos with the intention to
place the men in a certain warrior mindset. Through videos, books, and drone footage, the
mental preparation was set in motion for the described criminal war crime acts throughout
Afghanistan and Iraq (Quinn & Zilber, 2017).
Quinn and Zilber (2017) record eye witness accounts of some of these accusations, which
included practices of the mutilation of bodies, beheadings, killing of innocent non-combatants
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and a practice referred to as canoeing, which is shooting people in the head, which causes a V
shaped cavity in the head, exposing brain matter and leaving the face unrecognizable. The story
reported that this is a calling card of SEAL Team VI, so that the enemy would know they were
there and act as a deterrent to stop the enemy from fighting (Quinn & Zilber, 2017).
Stress and eustress in the military. The Department of Defense defines combat and
operational stress as, “The expected and predictable emotional, intellectual, physical, and/or
behavioral reactions of an individual who has been exposed to stressful events in war or stability
operations,” (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 37). With this definition of stress, eustress, and
combat stress comes into question the real-world application of stress and its triggered response
in the human body, as it relates to one’s level of Cultural Intelligence. Generally, in stressful
situations, one seeks to avoid such experiences in the form of a “fight or flight coping
mechanism” (Ranabir & Reetu 2015, paragraph 1).
In military servicemembers, this could possibly manifest in an individual actively
avoiding interactions with members of different cultures to avoid the stress reaction. Such
members of different cultures may belong to the same culture as combatants who have killed an
individual’s colleagues, engaged in firefights, or set off Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).
Conversely, and perhaps sadistically to a non-combat experienced civilian, there may exist
service members who seek interactions with members of the same culture as for them the
resulting eustress from defeating the enemy provides a form of pleasure. The challenge for many
soldiers who rely on hyper-vigilant skills to stay alive in combat environments is the transition
back to a civilian world where such intensity is not needed to function (Carey, 2016, para 8).
While this study does not include the scope to fully examine the question of the impact of
stress on a Special Operations Forces’ member’s level of Cultural Intelligence, it does aim to
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begin the discourse on the topic. There are many factors that combine to shape an individual’s
outlook on life. In the case of Special Operations Force members, they are exposed to frequent,
violent tours of duty and there are no other military units that are as exposed to multiple shortterm, violent combat action tours as are the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) members
(Terse 2011). It is unquestionable that exposure to such austere environments will take a toll on
one’s mental and physical health. This may be an area that can be exploited with personal
assessments such as the CQS. These types of assessments and counseling may assist DoD in
better evaluating and determining whether multiple deployments are in the individual’s best
interest, as well as the best interest the Special Operation Force (SOF) or the United States’
continued engagement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
Research on combat operations shows that repeated deployments to hostile areas can
include stressors that are unique to such missions. For example, veterans of Operation Desert
Storm cite the threat of enemy fire, dealing with U.S. casualties, and handling human remains as
significant sources of stress (Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2016). Yet while some military
peacekeeping personnel on deployments experience similar stressors, it is more likely to be on a
reduced scale (Hosekm, Kavanagh, and Miller, 2016).
Work by Hoge et al. (2004) focused on deployments in Afghanistan and in Iraq and the
stressors faced by service members in combat zones. Three to four months after returning from
their deployments, personnel were given a survey in which it was found by the authors that 58
percent of Army personnel deployed to Afghanistan, 89 percent of Army personnel in Iraq, and
95 percent of Marine Corps members in Iraq had been attacked or ambushed during their
deployment (Hoge, et al., 2004, p. 18). The study finds that, although combat experiences in
Iraq and in Afghanistan are often grouped as one and the same, in fact they are vastly dissimilar.
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Knowing someone who was killed, taking on hostile fire, and being ambushed were more
common among those who deployed to Iraq (Hoge, et al. 2004, p. 16).
Although certain scenarios generate varied stress response patterns, there are also distinct
differences in responses to the same situation among individuals. This propensity to display a
stress response pattern across a variety of stress-inducing situations is referred to as “response
stereotypy” (Lacey & Lacey 1958). In a study by Robison and Manacapilli (2014), the strategies
by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army were discussed in the approach to selecting members
using personality tests and one’s ability to manage stress. These findings indicate that the
military is aware of and proactive about the impact of stress on an operator’s ability to function.
In another study by Agrigoroaei, et al. (2013), it was commonly found that individuals
who displayed higher self-esteem generally exhibited lower cortisol responses to acute stressors
and performed better overall. Presumably, members of the SOF community do hold higher selfesteem and should be better than the average human at managing one’s individual response to
stress. However, what remains unclear is the toll, if any, that repeated exposure to high-threat
environments has on one’s ability to continue to manage one’s responses.
The returning warrior culture. The need to start with the warrior prior to confronting
battle through the use of cross-cultural training may prove worthy in the mental health of these
warriors throughout and at the conclusion of their deployments. CQS may be a method utilized
as a predictor of how these service members will reintegrate back into society. French (2005)
describes other cultures’ views of its warriors as having a social contract in which the society
fully understands what its warriors have endured.
Other cultures go as far as to accept and to prepare their warriors in understanding that
religious sins have been committed, usually in the name of Church or State, such as in the case of
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the Crusades. French (2005) discusses the need for a cleansing period in which warriors are
slowly brought back to a calmer, less brutal community, one standing in stark contrast to their
previously chaotic life. In the United States, however, while the media covers the high incidence
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that plagues the Veterans Administration, little is
done to address the problem of PSTD before it becomes an issue. The United States seems to
lack a sophisticated understanding on how to deal with returning warriors (French, 2005).
This lack of attention to the difficult transition a warrior must make when leaving combat
can be measured by the suicide rate among Special Forces members, which occurs at a higher
rate than that of other conventional combat units. As other military units have seen a trend
toward fewer recorded suicides, the SOF community is experiencing an increase (Shanker &
Oppel Jr., 2014). This would suggest that there are higher levels of stress within that community
that might have been reduced through greater cultural awareness.
Cross-Cultural Competency in the Military: Successes and Failures
As the literature cited above has shown, cross-cultural competency has become an area of
increasing concern in the months and years that followed the events of September 11, 2001.
That need has only increased in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, an invasion that ultimately
led to the destabilization of the entire Middle East (Engle, 2016). Naturally, any new initiative in
as complex an organization as the United States military, in an environment as chaotic as the war
on terror, would meet with both successes and failures. The following case studies present
examples of the success and failures of cross-cultural competency in the U.S. military.
The case of Saddam Hussein. One success, which led to one of the most newsworthy
events for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and for the Iraqi people, was the capture of
Saddam Hussein. While there are many anecdotal examples of the importance of cross-cultural
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success in the military environment, one use of cross-cultural competency that has not been
widely understood involves the capture of Saddam Hussein (McFate, 2005). The capture of
Hussein was the result of one of the tactics used to elicit information in Iraq following the
invasion, which focused on the capture of HVTs (High Value Targets). These HVTs were
former Iraqi government members of the Ba’athist party or the Revolutionary Command Council
devotedly loyal to Saddam Hussein (Lawton, 2016).
The faces of these HVTs were published on a deck of playing cards given to U.S. military
members as a visual aid to identify the targets. According to Navy Lt. Cmdr. Jim Brooks, a
spokesman for the Defense Intelligence Agency, this tactic was first used during the Civil War
and again during World War II (Sample, 2003). Saddam Hussein, the highest value target of
them all, was of course the Ace of Spades. It was believed that the capture and subsequent
interrogation of high-ranking officials would provide clues about Hussein’s location (Lawton,
2016). Up to this point, the pursuit of Saddam was viewed through a single lens that focused
exclusively on capturing and interrogating HTVs, a focus that allowed him to elude capture
(Lawton, 2016).
That was until a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) interrogator, Staff Sergeant Eric
Maddox, and an intelligence officer, Major Brian Reed from 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th
Infantry Division, decided to change the approach based on their cultural knowledge of the Arab
tribal system (Lawton, 2016). Their focus began to shift away from the pursuit of HVTs to
uncovering information about Saddam’s tribal connections, which mainly included people
outside of the government network. Maddox and Reed applied a strategy that began to identify
his secondary, familial, and tribal relationships (Lawton, 2016).
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This focus on Saddam’s informal network led to a major break when, on December 1,
Saddam’s former driver divulged the name of Muhammad Ibrahim, Saddam’s right-hand man
and a leader of the insurgency (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013). This piece of information
was used to piece together Ibrahim’s own kin network, leading to the interrogation of more than
40 members of his extended family. This painstaking investigation of informal networks and
family relationships eventually led to the capture of Hussein in 2003 (Defense Intelligence
Agency, 2013). Essentially, Maddox and Reed used their cultural knowledge of the importance
of Arab tribal clans to trace Saddam Hussein back to his roots in his ancestral village of Tikrit
(Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013).
The case of burning the Quran. On February 22, 2012, U.S. servicemembers at the
United States’ Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, which at the time housed hundreds of captured
Taliban and al Qaeda militants, began the process of burning some 2,000 books. This included
Qurans and other religious texts, which had been confiscated from the prisoners’ library; these
texts had apparently been used by them to send messages and were assumed to plot escape
attempts. Although warned by an Afghan interpreter not to burn religious texts, soldiers
nevertheless began the process by taking about 100 books to the base’s burn pit (Miklaszewski
and Courtney, 2012). Although Afghan laborers helping with the disposal stopped the burning
when they realized the nature of the texts, at least four Qurans had been badly burned (Bumiller,
2012).
Protests and riots subsequent to this event claimed the lives of at least two dozen people,
including four members of the United States forces (Harooni, 2012).
The case of the dead Taliban fighter. The following failure of cultural understanding
demonstrates how high the stakes are in the cultural battlefield and how a lack of cross-cultural
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competency could shape the behavior of service members. This story reflects more on a
dehumanizing culture of American youth and their transition to becoming warriors thrust into a
war, which for most of the young service members were only three to five years old at the time
of the 9/11 attacks. They grew up in a culture that only knew Taliban and Al Qaeda as evildoers.
So this story is more about a culture that bred these men for their actions, not a lack of crosscultural understanding, although there is merit for that as well.
The unfortunate incident that sparked international condemnation involved a video of
four Marines urinating on the body of a dead Taliban fighter. Sebastian Junger (2012), a
respected journalist and expert in war correspondence, argues that to the Marines, this event was
not a big deal. They certainly had no expectation that the picture would make it to the
Washington Post, eventually devolving into a life-altering event. Junger (2012) contends that
these men were preconditioned prior to entering the Marine Corps. Although damaging to the
image of the United States, Collation Forces, and the Marine Corps, their actions were
predictable when consideration of dehumanization of the enemy is in the mix. Junger (2012)
offers that,
It is difficult not to understand what led these four Marines to carry out this act.
In the reality of war and the preconditioning as they grew up in a post 9/11 society
these men justified their actions at the time with the question, what was the
difference between water boarding a live prisoner or urinating on a dead prisoner?
After all the government authorized them to shoot and kill this man with high
power rifles. (para. 12)
Junger (2012) goes on to argue that society is to blame and that there is a certain realism
of irony if the concept of war and the role society plays in the dehumanization of the enemy is
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taken into consideration. Young men and women are asked to kill the enemy all the while
remaining responsibly mindful of the human aspect of combat without the proper preparation for
the task at hand. As a solution to this situation, an effort to increase the level of one’s cultural
intelligence, or other efforts to increase other self-awareness concepts, could benefit warriors
through a deeper understanding of the actions and consequences of the human terrain with which
they are confronted.
The SOF Operator: A New Warrior-Diplomat
If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a
hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will
win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself you will be
imperiled and lose every single battle.
—Sun Tzu
The SOF community has recently been anointed into a new heading as the future offers
increased challenges and increased budgets with expansion of the SOF community. Turnley
(2010) argues for the necessity of the SOF warrior today and in the future and describes how the
traditional direct action missions connect with cross-cultural competence. It is and will continue
to be a controlled balance for warriors and will transform them into becoming warrior-diplomats.
The title “warrior-diplomats” offers a new era of progress and one that defends the need
for increased cross-cultural training (Turnley, 2010). The United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) strategic plan starts with its focus on the individual SOF member,
referred to as an “operator.” The first area of acknowledgement is that “the Operator needs to be
prepared to excel across the myriad of defense, diplomatic, and development activities . . . while
maintaining an unparalleled capability to employ direct action when necessary” (Turnley, 2010,

69
p. 1). This means that a member of the SOF community must now be able to shift focus from
warrior-based missions to one uncharacteristic of most of these elite units.
Today and the future have presented a direction forward for all Special Operation Force
units. The need for these small cohesive forces to lead the way in the future of warfare combines
expert skillsets with diplomatic necessities. Special Operations Forces are commonly ordered to
move behind enemy lines to work in a restricted area while gathering intelligence, conducting
raids, or engaging in other highly sensitive missions, as was certainly the case with Operation
Red Wing, the SEAL Team Six mission that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan (Schmidle,
2011). With the evolution of modern battlefields, traditional warriors have been forced to
undergo change. While change is difficult in any organization, for the SOF community the
transition to warrior-diplomat status demands new methodologies to combat the enemy. This
also requires a revised selection method and training for new members, as most SOF units rely
heavily on elevated mental and physical stamina to overcome the pain their members endure in
training and on the battlefield (Glicken-Turnley, 2011).
Although some traditional SOF missions remain, there are situations in which the Forces
are expected to interact with people of diverse cultures, such as in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The
new diplomacy requirements, combined with a high stress environment and the bravado
traditionally associated with SOF units, can lead to diminished levels of cultural performance.
These Special Forces face some of the highest redeployment rates in the military and a goal of
this research is to gain an understanding of the resulting outcomes (Shanker & Oppel, 2014).
Special Operation Force Members—a Unique Asset
The SOF members are recognized as more mature and extremely highly trained (Bucci,
2015) and they tend to fall under guidelines characteristic of a certain lifestyle. They are married
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with children, are between the ages of 29 and 34 years old, and have a minimum of eight years
active duty status in a conventional unit (Bucci, 2015). They further stand out by their
professional development as many SOF members, especially SF members, boast some foreign
language skills and all commonly possess higher education to include multiple degrees, even at
the enlisted levels. To wit, they have survived a highly stressful and difficult selection process to
undergo further training courses and they have been introduced to cross-cultural training in both
theory and in practical experience. All the while, they maintain the ability to operate and to
teach their skills in a cross-cultural environment (Bucci, 2015).
Unfortunately for military leadership, the mystery of what determines a solid SOF
warrior has yet to be answered, as there is not a formula that decides who makes it and who fails.
Certainly, there are some researchers who argue a strong personality plays a key role and that
athletic ability is necessary; yet, to debunk that thought, the military is full of Type-A
personalities and athletes. That being understood, every year many top performers try and
subsequently fail to join the SOF ranks with attrition rates ranging as high as 90 percent in some
of the most elite units and a more normal range of 65 to 80 percent as seen in a review of Naval
Special Warfare Command, Basic Underwater Demolition School (BUDs) (2006).
It becomes evident that most Special Operation Force (SOF) warriors are able to process
problems differently and more effectively, especially under stress. Their critical and independent
thinking skills, combined with high levels of imagination and initiative, provide them the unique
ability to operate with little to no support, while leaving little to no sign they were ever there.
While perhaps not the final determination of who makes an SF warrior, the SOF community’s
higher levels of personal awareness, unmatched drive, and other contributing factors have proved
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a successful model for small unit success in not only the military community but also within the
public and private sectors (Spearin, 2007).
It should be noted that this literature review examined the understudied area of cultural
intelligence in the military. A primary objective of the research is to determine whether CQ,
through the use of the CQS, is an effective tool for measurement for the military in general and,
more specifically, for the military’s Special Operation Forces (SOF). This research was
conducted on individual former members of the United States Marine Corps Special Operations
Units: The Raiders and Force Reconnaissance Companies. In addition, the data collected by this
study can be used to further investigate whether multiple combat tours are productive or counterproductive regarding cultural interactions in combat environments.
The selection process. The beginning of an SOF career is strictly on a volunteer basis.
For the most part, admittance to any Special Operations unit requires years of service in the
designated branch. Basic training, specialty school, and time in one’s job usually is a
prerequisite; however, some branches have streamlined the process. Yet, it is the standard that,
at a minimum, the servicemember must have completed basic training and a specialty school.
Once deciding to make the commitment, successfully passing the indoctrination phase and every
other school that is required of an SOF unit, it will take many years of training before a new SOF
member is fully qualified. The first step is the selection screening process, which is somewhat
unique for each branch of the service.
Senior and experienced SOF operators observe candidates to identify wanted and
unwanted character traits that become obvious in high-stress training. These include critical
thinking and problem solving, internal fortitude, following orders, physical strength, and
endurance, which have proven important for success in the past. Other desired traits include, but
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are not limited to, the ability to work as a member of a team while at the same time being able to
maintain independence and critical thinking. Depending on the branch of the service, the basic
screening processes may last weeks, although the exact process is kept secret to challenge the
participants and not allow them to prepare fully for the assessment. Over the years, individual
units have utilized external academic assistance to assess what makes certain men quit, while
others succeed. There remains no sure method to formulate who will make it through the
training. Certainly, some men may have a physical advantage over others, but this has not
guaranteed success. Additionally, some SOF units blend in cross-cultural assessments and
training into their programs.
The SOF community seeks rare individuals with above average attributes to add to the
team dynamics, including but not limited to general intelligence (IQ), emotional intelligence
(EQ), social intelligence (SQ), and high levels of motivation. Since SOF members are
painstakingly screened prior to joining their units and continuously assessed throughout their
careers, it can be assumed that by the mere membership in their community each holds
specialized traits, such as asymmetrical thinking, intelligence, drive, motivation and self-control.
Some SOF warriors are trained specifically in cross-cultural interaction. And, although the
Army Special Forces members are only a fraction of the entire SOF community, they necessitate
special recognition within the study. While the remaining joint service members who contribute
to the SOF community may not have equal, in-depth cross-cultural training to the level that the
Army SF members do, they share a common asymmetrical approach to their work.
Special Forces members can be expected to possess high levels of motivation and selfcontrol; the very attributes that research has shown predict a high ranking on the CQS. In
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addition, David Livermore has shown the connection between motivation, self-control, and
formal higher education and high levels of cross-cultural effectiveness (Livermore, 2011).
Research has been completed on foreign military SOF members. Dr. Emily Spencer
(2010), for example, conducted research on Canadian Special Operations Forces, which provides
rare observations by outsiders into Special Operations. This form of research is essential to
understand SOF units and cultural intelligence. Spencer’s (2010) discussion of CQ adds an
international contribution to the discussion about the benefits of using CQ in the military. It is
understood that any military unit working in a foreign culture benefits from an understanding of
not only their enemy but also of the civilians who live within the boundaries of the chaos of war.
War may be described as a cultural quagmire that weighs heavily on military units in
which the additional layer of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is a force multiplier. Given that a
culture is based on a system of common beliefs and values, if a unit can tap in to such preset
concepts no matter how different they are from the unit’s culture, that increases the success rate
and hence the addition of CQ as a force multiplier (Spencer, 2010, Chapter 4).
The U.S. military viewed the issue of culture awareness with great regard and understood
the need to become better participants as students of CQ. And, while the military has identified
this area, it has failed to institutionalize fully the concept throughout the ranks (MacMillan,
Walker, Clarke & Mark, 2013). In the context of this study, the Special Operations community
makes for a logical population to select, as the men are asymmetrical warriors faced with
difficult conditions who must rely on training and on intelligence to make split second decisions
in austere environments. To that end, a Special Operations team member spends years acquiring
the skills to join an operational team and has been evaluated continually since arrival at their
respective units (Glicken-Turnley, 2011).
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Conclusion
The administration of sample CQS surveys throughout a military member’s career could
offer a glimpse as to what alters one’s perceptions on CQ. The literature review, combined with
the research in this study, enhances the overall picture of cross-cultural competency (3C), as it
examines key factors to be assessed through the demographic survey and through personal
interviews. The CQS alone does not reveal the fabric of what causes warriors to shape their
cross-cultural views, but it does offer a personal assessment that allows for self-improvement.
The personal assessment, combined with personal interviews and CQ counseling, may offer a
better overall alignment for future military success.
Arguably, this is precisely where the CQ business model may fail to provide enough of
an in-depth look to why the results are what they are. Further, the study explores merging
cultural Intelligence CQ as a tool to enhance the military’s Cross-Cultural Competency 3C
program. Cross-cultural training and the military are topics well represented in literature;
however, what becomes apparent in the literature review is the dearth of general information
connecting CQ and the military. This is likely because CQ has concentrated on the business
sector; although it does include military members within its database, the database is a wide
selection of more than 58,000 military, senior and junior executives, government and nongovernment organizations, students, and other business sector members that as of December
2016 represent 98 countries (Livermore, 2016).
Although CQ is relatively new, its use has been proclaimed successful by the Cultural
Intelligence Center and many other academic professionals in the social science field. Yet U.S.
military leadership has demonstrated little room to intertwine anthropology and sociology into
training its warriors. In fact, the military’s rush to better understand how to control the human
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terrain of the battlefield resulted in hastily planned efforts to manage cross-cultural
environments. Such a focus on the overall situation led to a lack of attention on the importance
of measuring the individual. And, due to the hierarchical, holistic approach the military
necessitates, it is understandable how the needs of an individual have been overlooked.
As of 2016, the Department of Defense invested over a billion dollars to resolve a method
to best ensure service members are prepared for cross-cultural environments (DoD, 2005).
Leadership in search of hasty solutions to the challenges that new conflicts presented developed
programs that, in review, never had a serious chance of success. Understanding the cultural gaps
within the military necessitates an examination of previous areas where the military exhibited a
lack of understanding in how to manage cultural programs (Holmes-Eber, 2014).
One example involves the deployment of U.S. military Korean linguists to Iraq, a blatant
underutilization of manpower. In fact, it is believed that “a rate of underutilization hovering
around 26% according to 2005–2006 placement” exists among graduated USMC Foreign Affair
Officers FAO’s (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p. 171). Imagine a pilot who trains for more than two
years exclusively as a pilot, but when he leaves school has a 26% chance of flying (HolmesEber, 2014). This is a prime example of underutilization of manpower, not to mention an
example of a true motivation killer (Holmes-Eber, 2014).
The question remains as to what approach is best to enhance cross-cultural encounters.
Cross-Cultural Competency (3C) would be considered a softer skill set, and, although its place in
combat is critical, it is often overshadowed by technology until the human terrain becomes a
problem for the leadership, such as the growing insurgency witnessed in Iraq (Hubert, 2014).
Frequently, it is not until the military begins to lose control of the cultural battlefield that it seeks
a deeper appreciation of the enemy’s culture (Herbert, 2014).
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The Department of Defense has dabbled in welcoming outside assistance in a better-latethan-never approach to understanding culture to influence how a war is fought (Connable, 2009).
What is unilaterally agreed on is the need for 3C and its legitimate place at the table; however,
what remains unanswered is how to implement a service-wide system that meets these
challenges (Gallus et al., 2014). Yet, after nearly fifteen years of fighting an irregular war in
Afghanistan and again in Iraq, there remains no clear plan for training in cross-cultural
communication.
This literature review demonstrates the existing challenges facing the initial research over
the past decade, the continued examination over the pending questions and arguments, the
subsequent development in the pursuit of similarities and differences among varied cultures, and
different work organizations that involve CQ. Recognizing these dimensions as the foundation
of the dissertation allows for questions and for future research to add to the existing literature for
others to follow.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
In an effort to further explore the area of cross-cultural competency through the lens of
cultural intelligence (CQ) within the military, in particular the Special Operation Force
community, this study examines the current approach to cross-cultural competency by
conducting a comprehensive study. The research followed a sequential mixed method design
that combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques through three online surveys
guided by Creswell’s (2013) description of research requirements. The quantitative phase
consists of two surveys. The first is a demographic survey administered online via Survey
Monkey and is composed of 20 questions (Appendix C). It was used to determine a participant’s
eligibility and assignment to one of the two groups. Group A, which consists of former SOF,
MEUSOC, and MARSOC units and Group B, consisting of former Army Special Forces “Green
Beret” members.
The second survey is the backbone of the research as it establishes the baseline of the
sample participants’ capacity for cross-cultural understanding. This is accomplished through the
concept of Cultural Intelligence (CQ), which is accompanied by a tool that gathers detailed
information on personal CQ vis-à-vis the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) (Van Dyne et al.,
2015). The CQS is widely accepted by numerous organizations, including the military, as a tool
that provides a snapshot of an individual’s personal awareness as it relates to cross-cultural
awareness (Livermore 2016).
The CQS provides a percentile score that is measured against a database of over 58,000
participants representing 98 countries as of December 2016 (Cultural Intelligence Center 2016).
These data are used to compare Group A to Group B by providing an individual and group score
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in relationship to the database. Further, the CQS provides the answers to the first two research
questions. The CQS survey is presented through an online direct link to the Cultural Intelligence
Center and consists of a twenty-question multiple choice questionnaire, divided into the four
areas of Cultural Intelligence: CQ Drive, CQ Knowledge, CQ Action, and CQ Strategy, which
are further broken into sub-categories (Appendix E).
The third and final survey represents the qualitative portion of the study and allowed the
sample participants to provide multiple choice answers, and to add detailed responses to those
questions (Appendix F). There are eight opportunities for the participants to add comments to
their answers and provide detailed insight into why and how they chose their answers. This
approach offered an opportunity to gain invaluable insight to the reasoning and methodology of
each participant’s answers. Through the use of these three surveys, the researcher used a mixed
method research that was designed to explore and expand on answering the following research
questions and hypotheses.
The research intends to add to and enhance previous research with Cross-Cultural
Competency (3C) within the DoD. Creswell (2013) discusses the idea that research should
provide information intended to enhance an existing body of knowledge. The DoD is a multidimensional entity that is composed of internal cultures and subcultures. This research examines
the DoD though the lens of a specifically targeted sample group of all male former Special
Operation Force (SOF) and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC)
members.
Research Question 1
How do the results of selected SOF and MEUSOC groups vary on the Cultural
Intelligence Scale (CQS) self-assessment survey?
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H1o. Army Green Berets from Group B will outperform Group A due to their
heightened cross-cultural relationships with their mission, enabling them to take
on a unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and operating
within a different cultural setting.
H1a. Army Green Berets from Group B will not outperform Group A due to their
heightened cross-cultural relationships of their missions causing them to take on a
unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and operating
within a different cultural setting.
Research Question 2
How do the sample groups’ scores compare with the current database consisting of 98
countries and more than 58,000 business participants as of December 2016?
H2o. Groups A and B median scores will be equal to or higher than the Cultural
Intelligence Centers Database.
H2a. Groups A and B median scores will not be equal to or higher than the
Cultural Intelligence Center database.
Research Question 3
How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute and correlate
with the CQS survey?
H3o. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will discover correlation
patterns between the sample groups and the CQ database.
H3a. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will not discover
correlation patterns between the sample groups and the CQ database.
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Setting
The researcher’s physical location in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at the time of the
study led the researcher to rely heavily on social media and previous personal connections
between the researcher and the sample population. Further, as a former Force Reconnaissance
Marine, the researcher was able to solicit participants from the entire SOF and MEUSOC
community and attain a certain engagement from the community without direct relationships
with the participants. The study was conducted utilizing online surveys, and communication
with the participants was via email.
Participants
The target population consists of former military service members divided into two
groups. Group A contains 25 Special Operation Force (SOF), Marine Special Operations
Command, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) members
representing a mixture of all branches of the services. Of the Group A sample group, the
majority was from the United States Marine Corps Special Operation Command MARSOC, and
other Special Operations Marines (Force Reconnaissance and Division Reconnaissance
elements). The other SOF participants in Group A include personnel from Navy Sea Air and
Land (SEALs), Special Warfare Combat Craft or Special Boat Team (SWCC/SBU), Army
Rangers, and Air Force Para Rescue (PJs).
Group B consists solely of 10 former U.S. Army Green Berets, better known within the
SOF community as Special Forces (SF), a highly unique group of individuals whose mission
demands the same core insertion skills as other SOF units (Airborne Static-line and Military
Freefall, Combat diving, and individual specialty development courses). However, after the core
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skills are completed, the SF members pursue tracks of professional development different from
that of their Group A counterparts.
As previously mentioned in the literature review, the SF members’ main mission is to
work with indigenous people by developing cultural understanding and building bonds of trust
that can withstand the worst conditions that combat operations produce.
The members of the sample groups were selected based on affiliation with the specific
identified units, which were selected due to the hypotheses that the SOF, MARSOC, and
MEUSOC population has a greater probability of increased exposure to cross-cultural
experiences during their military service.
The former SOF and MEUSOC members represent a sample group, which is tasked with
decision-making and operational tempo in multiple cross-cultural training and combat
operations. Due to privacy concerns and strict Internal Review Board conditions regarding the
involvement of active duty military members, the decision was made to recruit a sample group of
former military service members, access to which is not so constrained. The sample group
provides a broad swath of individuals, with many still working within SOF parameters as
civilians. Additionally, some of the sample group are or have been continuously exposed to
cross-cultural environments after separation from the military.
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Data

Using a quantitative and qualitative mixed method design for the study necessitated a
linear approach to better manage the process. Such an approach allows the research to ensure
that accurate sample group placement is accomplished and that individuals who do not meet the
research criteria are removed from the study before proceeding to the next step. The
demographic survey ensured that the sample participants met the parameters of being former
SOF or MEUSOC members so they could be placed in the respective group. Creswell (2013)
refers to this type of linear progress as an explanatory sequential design.
The quantitative phase lays the foundation through two online surveys. First, a
demographic survey that assigned members to groups while disqualifying respondents who
failed to meet research criteria. Second, once these groups were selected, the Cultural
Intelligence Scale personal assessment survey was administered to both groups.
All quantitative and qualitative surveys were granted a seven-day completion schedule;
however, provisions were made to accommodate special cases due to participant travel or
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deployment outside the United States and emergency medical situations. Study participants were
recruited through social media postings and direct connections to the researcher (Appendix B).
The researcher solicited assistance by posting a request online for private Special Operations
groups. Such sites are small and well-vetted by the groups. To become a member of a group
proof is required through a known referral that can vouch for a person’s identity and
participation in SOF and MEUSOC. Both social media and word of mouth provided ample
snowball sampling.
The importance of the CQS to the quantitative data cannot be understated, as the results
from the instrument provide measureable scores that directly address the first two research
questions. The third and final survey, an open-ended qualitative survey, was utilized to provide
personal insight into the participants’ cross-cultural training, understanding, personal awareness
and, most importantly, personal experiences with success and failure. Survey Monkey and Nivio
qualitative software analysis tools, combined with manual review and summative approach to the
qualitative data, provided the opportunity to examine common trends, concerns, and validation,
and identify areas for improvement within the current DoD training system.
The analysis was initiated by identifying and subsequently quantifying words and phrases
used in the open-ended questions by respondents, so that further clarifications could be made
about the context of these words and statements. Open-ended questions in the online surveys
were used as probes to gather more information regarding prior answers chosen. The words and
themes presented were essentially coded and subsequently quantified based on consensus by
three independent coders as in figure 5.
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Figure 6. A diagram of the coding process
A summative approach to qualitative content analysis was chosen to further elucidate
trends in the data and participant thought processes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The summative
approach allows the researcher to move past the word key counts in the qualitative analysis and
examine alternate terms and phrases (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This approach opened more
opportunity to expand concepts from the small sample population, providing more depth of
information to be extracted from the open-ended survey through “euphemistic versus explicit.”
This allowed more variables to be added to the research and enhanced the overall mixed-method
design (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1285).
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Analysis Discussion
Upon completion, the surveys were aligned with the corresponding individual to ensure
they were correctly matched to their occupational specialty group. Once confirmed, participants’
names and email addresses were removed from the research, now identified only as a member of
Group A or of Group B. The quantitative data was transferred to International Business
Machines (IBM) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Additional data
collected from the participants included age, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, position in the
military, number of deployments (if any), education, perception of cross-cultural relationships,
and direct combat experience, which will be further examined in Chapter 4.
The qualitative survey design allowed for short but descriptive responses, a technique
based on Creswell’s (2013) suggestion that using shorter, opened-ended questions allows for a
more efficient coding of the responses. A mixed method design allows the researcher to gain
invaluable information from the quantitative phase, which provides tangible statistics, while
using qualitative research to complete the research design.
Based on more than twelve years of service as a United States Marine, the researcher had
intimate knowledge of the sample population and, in turn, was easily accepted by and allowed
access to that sample population. The researcher’s service ranged from the infantry to Special
Operations and included attendance at several Army and Navy Special Operations schools, all of
which contributed to unfettered access to this fraternity. Creswell (2013) suggests that there is
no better method for understanding a group than to be a part of that group. In the past, scholars
have pointed to the difficulties a researcher faces in mixing with certain groups. For example,
such distinct populations as the homeless and prisoners are difficult for outsiders to penetrate and
gain acceptance from the group due to a lack of assimilation with those individuals (Creswell
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2013). This further supports the researcher’s position that the connection to the sample group
provides an outstanding advantage in conducting this research by collectively approaching the
research through a detailed knowledge of the target population.
Participants’ Rights
Protection of the privacy of these participants is critical, as many deserve special
consideration due to their previous positions and activities within the SOF and MEUSOC
community. Additionally, many of the sample group remain actively employed in hostile areas
where anonymity is still required. For these reasons, precautions have been taken to protect the
identities of participants, while adhering to the strict guidelines covered by the Internal Review
Board (IRB) at the University of New England. Signed consent forms were retained by each
participant, with copies forwarded to the researcher for record (Appendix C).
Ethical Considerations
One of the primary ethical considerations is the researcher’s relationship with many of
the members of the target population. The researcher has close ties within the SOF and
MEUSOC community and recognizes the realistic issue that bias is possible on the part of both
researcher and participant. Given the researcher’s experience as a Force Reconnaissance Marine
with several deployments to hostile areas, including Iraq and Afghanistan as an active duty
Marine and as a U.S. Government contractor, biases are almost inevitable but manageable with
this understanding and knowledge.
Because of the researcher’s background, an opportunity exists in the research for
professional bias in examining the qualitative survey. However, the researcher believes at this
time that the benefits of his association with the SOF and MEUSOC communities outweigh any
possible negative consequences. Some precautions were taken in analyzing the qualitative data,
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although it is important to note that the traditional interviewer/interviewee relationship
associated with open-ended qualitative study was not present in this study. This was due to the
fact that the participant answers were acquired through an online survey with no face-to-face
meeting.
The largest potential of researcher bias was in the analyses of the responses; therefore,
steps were required to reduce such bias. To manage this bias, the use of a reflexive journal by
the researcher supported efforts to identify and control bias throughout the analysis of the
responses. Furthermore, a triangulation method was applied in the qualitative study as a means
to ensure a rich and credible qualitative study was completed.
Finally, the researcher’s background offers a unique perspective that enriches the study
and is far better suited to researching this unique community than that of an outsider. The
understanding of the project dynamics and the pure quantitative data produced by the research
offers the most effective safeguard for objectivity throughout the process.
Potential Limitations
This study is limited to a select group of former SOF and MEUSOC military
servicemembers who, due to specialized training, deployment schedules, and exposure to crossculture environments, should not be considered a direct representation of the entire armed
services. Additionally, a notable area the quantitative data do not provide is each individual’s
understanding of culture prior to joining the military. Bias from the researcher and the
respondent are real concerns for a research study. Some of these concerns are taken from
Experimental Research, (2016), which outlines bias that needs to be understood and addressed.
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Participant Bias
The data relies on the survey participants’ willingness to participate and to give the
surveys serious attention. This is especially true with the CQS and the open-ended surveys, both
of which require thoughtful and honest self-evaluation and consideration by the participant.
Social and acquaintance bias. The CQS is additionally vulnerable to social desirability
and acquaintance bias, since the participant may answer in a manner they believe society or the
researcher would want them to answer. One method to combat this bias is to conduct peer
evaluations in conjunction with the personal assessment survey. However, in this study, due to
the difficulty in utilizing active duty service members which required IRB approval from the
University of New England as well as from the Marine Corps University, the answers may not
accurately reflect all members’ level of cultural awareness, motivation, or behavior.
This understanding restricted the researcher in sample group selection. Additionally,
with the loss of a cohesive sample group such as an active duty platoon, the use of both self and
peer CQS surveys was no longer viable and the loss of the peer evaluation created certain
limitations in the study. As a consequence, the self-evaluation alone allows room for bias;
therefore responses may not accurately reflect one’s true level of cultural awareness, motivation,
or behavior.
Researcher Bias
There are additional concerns about the researcher role in the study regarding how the
data are managed. This starts with the design of the research methodology and continues
throughout the collection process. The researcher did not have direct access to the sample group
in this study, so some of the bias is removed simply due to lack of contact, which is especially
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true in the survey. Utilizing a mixed-method design further opens this possibility with both
quantitative and qualitative methods being utilized.
Selection and sampling bias. This bias could not be avoided and was designed as part
of the research study. The selection of the Special Operation Force community allowed the
research to dive into a small elite community, which well serves the study of cross-cultural
competency. This community has extensive exposure to cross-cultural interaction, which
represents why cultural intelligence in some form is an important factor in the military.
Although admittedly this bias exists, it is manageable with open recruitment to all branches of
the service that meet the criteria of being in one of the selected units. This sampling is viewed as
an enhancing contribution to the study.
Further, the majority of the sample groups consisted of former Special Force and Marine
special operation members. The selection of Special Force members was necessary; however,
the high number of Marines that responded was due to the researcher’s background in the Marine
Corps and snowballing sampling response was heaviest in the Marine community. There are two
other biases that accompany the aforementioned defense, inclusive and omission bias. It is true
that, due to the small sample group, the research was designed to omit certain military units.
Some of this was due to IRB restricting the use of active duty military. The decision was made
to use only the former service SOF units.
Reporting Bias. This is common today with the large amount of internet information,
the volume of positive research conclusions, and the elimination of many null hypothesis
findings. As the amount of data grows throughout the many research sources of today, it is
becoming common that negative findings are less frequently located. This null hypothesis
finding is less likely to surface in a literature review. As this study’s literature review relied to
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some degree on the internet, it must be affirmed that this dependence is a potential bias. That
being understood, many negative outcomes from lack of cultural competence were documented
in the literature review. The university library was relied on heavily and the search sought only
credible scholarly sources to include.
The understanding of this bias assisted the researcher in managing this concern, as well
as encouraging a deeper examination of data. Moreover, the research produced a null
hypothesis, which will contribute to prior literature. This researcher combined positive and
negative research findings and represented all these areas throughout the research.
Measurement bias. This is yet another factor that arises from the restrictive nature of
this research study. Due to the small sample sizes of the study, the quantitative research proved
too small to recognize the possibility that the results were actually greater than could be proven
through the statistical data, and there is the real possibility that the data is skewed by the size of
the sample group. It was important to present the findings to adequately address the hypothesis,
rather recognize and address this limitation, as was done in the study.
This researcher also acknowledges that the sample population arrives without previous
testing of cultural awareness and this lack of correlation makes the scores acquired in this
research study stand alone on their merit. Data about the timing of a participant’s entry into the
military, assignment to their units, pre- and post-deployment, and post military service would
provide invaluable contributions to future research data. In further research, collecting both
individual and peer surveys to identify “playing to the survey” scenarios would be beneficial.
While the data may provide correlations between CQ ratings and individual Marine and Special
Operation Force members’ characteristics, these correlations do not necessitate causation and
would benefit from additional analysis.
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One final area to understand is that the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database is an
analytical tool that continues to grow and evolve. The study represents a snapshot of the
database at this point in time (last 2 quarters of 2016). Just within the time this research was
conducted, the base has grown by more than 8,000 participants. There is no reason to think the
database will change significantly in the future, but attention must be drawn to this possibility.
The database is most useful in identifying where the sample group participants fall on the CQS
spectrum, and primary consideration should be given to the standard deviations between the
sample groups, rather than to comparisons to the actual database. In fact, the Cultural
Intelligence Center considers the median scores of the CQS to be proprietary information.
Therefore, it is impossible to provide an accurate standard deviation between the sample group
scores and the database.
The CQS does provide a percentage of the individual’s position against the current
database of 58,000 participants. The small sample response, comparing 58,000 from the Cultural
Intelligence Center database to 35 responses from the sample group, will skew the statistical
trends and bias. Furthermore, this comparison should not be considered as significant as the
CQS correlation between Groups A and B. However, with this understanding the data remain
significant in comparison between the 58,000 and the sample group of 35 participants and the
research study data, and are useful to determine where an individual survey participant compares
against the database.
Usefulness of Findings to Stakeholders
The findings of the study highlight key traits that allow some individuals to function
successfully in the military while others fail. In addition, the research examines what factors can
improve Cross-Cultural Competency. Although much of the attention of this research is focused
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on the Special Operation Force community, the broader intent is to explore characteristics that
would help the basic infantry, who face their responsibilities with less training and preparation
than their SOF counterparts. Additionally, Bo’s story exemplifies a cause for concern, since the
military asks 18-year-old men and women to make life and death decisions with little to no
cultural intelligence training.
The study aims to provide the DoD and other professional stakeholders with new material
so those stakeholders may use the findings to make a difference in the lives of military and the
people caught in conflicts. In the case of the military, the stakeholder is a global community that
includes all the lives affected by the presence of a military force within a given geographical
area. The military’s ability to navigate such human terrain is critical to the continued success of
the DoD.
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CHAPTER 4
Results
Outlined in this chapter are the results of the explanatory sequential, mixed method
design, which utilized data gathered through three surveys. The intent of this design was to
discover purposeful factors that influence cross-cultural competency viewed through the lens of
the Cultural Intelligence Scale. The study utilized a purposely-crafted sample group, which
consisted of 54 former Special Operation Force (SOF), Marine Special Operations Command
(MARSOC), and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC)
participants. The design allows data to be explored and for the researcher to identify any
correlations between the sub-sample groups (Group A and Group B) and their survey results.
Further, the study presents comparison data of scores between the sample groups and the
Cultural Intelligence Center’s database of 58,000 participants at the time of this study.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1
How do the results of selected SOF and MEUSOC groups vary on the Cultural
Intelligence Scale (CQS) self-assessment survey?
H1o. Army Green Berets from Group B will outperform Group A due to their
heightened cross-cultural relationships included in their missions enabling them to
take on an unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and
operating within a different cultural setting.
H1a. Army Green Berets from Group B will not outperform Group A due to their
heightened cross-cultural relationships of their missions causing them to take on a
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unique role over other SOF and MEUSOC members, by living and operating
within a different cultural setting.
Research Question 2
How do the sample groups’ scores compare with the current database consisting of 98
countries and more than 58,000 business participants as of December 2016?
H2o. Groups A and B median scores will be equal to or higher than the Center
for Cultural Intelligence’s database.
H2a. Groups A and B median scores will not be equal to or higher than the
Center for Cultural Intelligence’s database.
Research Question 3
How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute to and
correlate with the CQS survey?
H3o. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will discover correlation
patterns between the sample groups and CQ database.
H3a. The open-ended design of the qualitative survey will not discover
correlation patterns between the sample groups and CQ database.
Participant Study Variables
The study utilizes the scores taken from Van Dyne et al. (2015) CQS personal assessment
survey as its foundation and in examining correlations among the three surveys. Questions
ranging from education levels, deployment frequencies to cross-cultural areas, religion, and
specific unit assignment addressed just a few of the areas in which the surveys gathered
information. The goal was to offer data analysis to support the CQS scores in addressing the
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primary research study question, “What are the identifying factors that affect Cross-Cultural
Competency scores within the former Special Operations community?”
The criteria for the sample group participants did not demand combat experience;
however, it was a significant factor in the sample group and reflective of the nation’s
engagement of more than a decade fighting two wars. In the demographic survey, only 15
percent reported no combat deployments while 56 percent reported three or more combat
deployments (Survey Monkey 2016). All quantitative and qualitative survey respondents were
granted a seven-day completion schedule; however, in some cases up to 28 days was granted for
requested special cases due to participant travel, deployment outside the United States, and
emergency medical situations.
From the recruitment efforts, 71 respondents expressed interest in participating in the
study. The first quantitative survey—the demographic survey—was administered by sending 71
email requests via Survey Monkey, to which 54 people responded. After eliminating anyone
who did not meet the research criteria (membership in SOF, MARSOC, or MEUSOC), the pool
was narrowed to 42 participants. Those 42 participants were used in the next step of the
quantitative phase: administration of the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) personal assessment
survey. From the 42 requests sent to participate in the CQS, 35 participants completed the CQS
survey. The results provide a purposeful sample group, with Group A consisting of 25 SOF,
MARSOC, and MEUSOC participants, and Group B consisting of 10 Special Force “Green
Beret” members.
The final survey was the qualitative open-ended survey also sent via email to the 35
respondents with a final, open-ended survey yield of 30 responses. The qualitative survey was
used to support the quantitative survey data.
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Quantitative Data Results
The quantitative data was constructed by utilizing a sequential design to facilitate the
research. The demographic survey was the first to be sent to the respondents and screened for
the required sample group criteria, in order to provide useful evidence to correlate individual
CQS scores. The second part of the study was the CQS personal assessment survey, which was
the study baseline through the CQS personal assessment survey.
Statistical Methodology for Quantitative Data
The statistical analysis was conducted with IBM SPSS v. 23.0. In this report, data
preparation methods are discussed, descriptive statistics are presented, and the research questions
are addressed.
Data preparation and descriptive of quantitative data. Data for the 35 participants
were imported from Excel into SPSS. In Table 1, descriptive data for the participants are
presented. Some missing data were present in the dataset and those responses were omitted from
analyses. For this reason, some categories do not add up to 35. More than two thirds of the
group members were other Special Forces and only 28.6 percent of respondents were Green
Berets. On the whole, the groups had a high education level, with more than 70 percent having
at least a bachelor’s degree. Some of the analysis that demonstrates significant majorities were
age, with 50 percent ranging from ages 40-49 and an overwhelming white sample group of 72
percent. Religion indicated was 71 percent Christian. Sixty percent participated in three or more
deployments to cross-cultural areas, which for most are hostile combat deployments.
To determine if there were any significant demographic predictors within the CQS, the
demographic quantitative survey data was prepared for use with a regression model. To do this,
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certain variables were collapsed into smaller categories and dummy coded to ensure there were
enough respondents in each category to successfully run the model.
This included Race (White vs. Minority) and Region (East vs. West). The next step
involved the construction of a regression model to test for significant predictors of Cultural
Intelligence Scale scores. This model is sufficient for exploratory research questions such as the
one included in the study. The following possible predictors were included in the regression
model: Group Type (Group A to include all other special operation units vs. Group B to include
only Green Berets), Age, Race, Religion, Region, Education Level, Parents’ Education Level,
Language Abilities, and number of deployments. However, this exploratory model concluded
with insignificant results, indicating that the particular model was insufficient to predict
accurately the outcome variable F(9, 20) = 1.47, p =.22, R2 = .40, Adjusted R2 = .13).
The researcher then adopted the multiple models of regression where each individual
predictor was entered into the model to test for individual effects. Upon conducting this
analysis, it was determined that the sole predictor of Cultural Intelligence Scale scores was the
number of deployments, with higher numbers of deployments associated with higher CQS scores
(b=.42, p<.05).
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Reading Scores
Variable
Group

Categories

N, %

Other Special
Forces
Green Berets

25(71.4%)
10(28.6%)

30-39
40-49
50-59
White
Hispanic
African American
Asian
Other

7 (20.6%)
17(50.0%)
10(29.4%)
23 (71.9%)
3 (9.4%)
1 (3.1%)
2 (6.3%)
3 (9.4%)

New England
East North Central
East South Central
Middle Atlantic
West South Central
West North Central
Pacific
Mountain

3 (9.1%)
5 (15.2%)
4 (12.1%)
9 (27.3%)
4 (12.1%)
1 (2.9%)
4 (12.1%)
3 (8.6%)

Christian/Catholic
Other Religion
No Religion
HS Diploma or Less
Associates or Some College
Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Degree

24 (70.6%)
3 (8.8%)
7 (20.6%)
3 (9.1%)
7 (21.2%)
13 (39.4%)
10 (30.3%)

Father’s Education
Level

HS Diploma or Less
Associates or Some College
Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Degree

14 (42.4%)
8 (24.2%)
4 (12.1%)
7 (21.2%)

Mother’s Education
Level

HS Diploma or Less
Associates or Some College
Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Degree

14 (42.4%)
7 (21.2%)
7 (21.2%)
5 (15.2%)

Yes
No

12 (34.3%)
22 (62.9%)

0
1
2
3 or more

3 (8.6%)
6 (17.1%)
5 (14.3%)
21 (60.0%)

Age Range

Race

Geographic Region

Religion
Education Level

Speak Another
Language?
Number of
Deployments

Note. Survey Monkey demographic data created by John Buffin, 2016

99
After observing the descriptive trends in the data, the scale data from the Cultural
Intelligence Scale was calculated. Cultural intelligence (CQ) was assessed with the 20-item
Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) by Van Dyne et al. (2015) who demonstrated the scale’s fourfactor structure of the construct, along with other psychometric properties such as factor
equivalence, reliability, and temporal stability (Appendix E). In the present study, the overall
CQ scale had high reliability (a = 0.92), along with its four-dimensional sub-scales:
metacognitive CQ (a = 0.90), cognitive CQ (a = 0.91), motivational CQ (a = 0.89), and
behavioral CQ (a = 0.90).
All items were measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to confirm the dimensionality of the 20 CQ items.
Specifying a model where the four metacognitive items, six cognitive items, five motivational
items, and five behavioral items load onto their corresponding CQ facets, and where all CQ
facets load onto an overall CQ construct, the model had sufficient fit (v2 [166] = 421.82 p = .00;
CFI = 0.91; SRMR = 0.06; RMSEA = 0.08), although some of the fit indices were slightly below
the criteria cutoffs suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999).
Qualitative Data Results
A summative approach to qualitative content analysis was used to further elucidate trends
in the data as well as participant thought processes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The summative
content approach to the qualitative analysis allows the researcher to move past the word key
counts in the qualitative analysis and examine alternate terms (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This
approach opened more opportunity to expand concepts from the small sample population and
provided more depth of information to be extracted from the open-ended survey through
“euphemistic versus explicit,” thereby allowing more variables added to the research to enhance
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the overall mixed-method design (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1285). Tables 8–15 demonstrate a
notable difference between frequently used words and what the actual response implies in the
study. Use of the summative content analysis allows for the interpretation of the respondent’s
words.
Mixed-Method Results
Research Question 1
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate how the results of selected SOF and Marine
Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) groups vary on the CSQ selfassessment survey. To determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between
Green Berets and Other Special Units, an independent sample t-test was performed to examine
between-group differences. While the Group A had a slightly lower average score (M=4.33,
SD=.34) than Group B (M=4.24, SD=1.17), (t 31)=4.49, p=.73). There was no statistical
significance between the mean CQS scores of Group A, N=25, M=79.64, SD=14.12 and Group
B, N=10, M= 87.70, SD=9.25. The researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis.
Table 2. The Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) Scores Reported
Group
Group A

Mean
79.2000

N
25

Standard Deviation
14.75353

Group B
87.7000
10
9.25023
Total
81.6286
35
13.83747
Note. Table reflects data from Groups A and B mean scores. Created by John Buffin,
2016
Table 3. Group Statistics
Group
N
Mean
Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
CQS
Group A
25
79.6400
14.12114
2.82423
Group B
10
87.7000
9.25023
2.92518
Note. Group standard deviations from CQS, created by John Buffin, 2016
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Table 4. Independent Samples Test for Groups A and B
Levene’s Test for Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.
t
CQS

t-test for Equality of Means
df

Sig. (2tailed)
.106

Mean
Difference
-8.06000

Equal variances
.744
.395
33
assumed
1.660
Equal variances not
- 25.342 .058
-8.06000
assumed
1.982
Note. Independent samples test using IBM SPSS, created by John Buffin, 2016

Table 5. Independent sample test
Std. Error Difference

CQS

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper
-17.93742
1.81742

Equal
4.85493
variances
assumed
Equal
4.06607
-16.42851
variances not
assumed
Note. Table created from IBM SPSS by John Buffin, 2016

.30851

Research Question 2
How do the sample groups’ scores compare to the database consisting of 98 countries and
over 58,000 business participants current as of December 2016? Both Groups A and B
completed the Cultural Intelligence Centers database. The CQS report is composed of 20
questions and, although there are no subjectively right or wrong questions, the CQS does provide
weight to certain answers, which ultimately provide a score. This score is placed into a
percentage and passed along in the report. The CQS provides a group percentage standing
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against the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database. It does not provide an overall ranking but
breaks down each category and makes the comparison.
Table 6. Group A Rating Against the Center for Cultural Intelligence’s Database

Note. This table is taken from the Group A CQS report created by the Cultural
Intelligence Center, 2016.
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Table 7. Group B Rating Against the Center for Cultural Intelligence’s Database.

Note. This table is taken from the Group B CQS report created by the Cultural
Intelligence Center, 2016.
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Research Question 3
How do the sample groups’ responses from the qualitative survey contribute to and
correlate with the CQS survey? The qualitative data provide a vast amount of variation in the
responses. Qualitative data are used to provide nuance for the quantitative findings and provide
a deeper understanding of a specific organization or event, rather than a surface description of a
large sample of population. They elucidate an explicit rendering of broad patterns that present in
a group of participants and allow one the ability to make sense of the quantitative data in a
meaningful way.
The quantitative results provided no significant associations or predictors of crosscultural attitudes with the exception of multiple deployments correlating with higher CQS scores.
Other than that, there were no significant demographic predictors of the cross-cultural scale. In
full disclosure, this researcher believes that the variation results are related more to the small
sample and diverse unit affiliations selected. If the opportunity was provided to survey a much
larger population with a different tool, the research may have provided more proof to meet the
hypothesis.
The nature of the qualitative data does not allow for direct correlation to the quantitative
data, since qualitative data is not numeric by nature. The qualitative data provided the ability to
“dig deeper” into the issues and highlight the diverse range of responses and experiences of the
sample group. The Survey Monkey and NVivo analysis software alone do not reflect an accurate
representation of the data. In the following tables, a clearer picture is reflected of the
respondent’s expressions in the open-ended survey by utilizing the summative approach, which
allowed for a deeper understanding of the survey data with clear differences between the NVivo
Survey Monkey key words to the summative descriptions.
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Tables 8–15 offer an example of the software-driven key words with a side-by-side
comparison of the interpretation of the sample groups’ comments in an attempt to define the
euphemistic value of the discussion over the softwares more explicit interpretation of the openended survey, thus allowing more variables, which lead to the true essence of the comments
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). There are three areas that provide this information with the software
key words in the first colum, the summative approach in the second colume and finally actual
comments extracted from the open-ended survey.
Table 8. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understanding Through Summative Content Analysis of
Question 1 of the Open-Ended Survey, Understanding of Cognitive, Metacognitive, Motivation,
and Behavior Importance

Summative Content Analysis

Survey Monkey
NVivo analysis

Frequent
Identified
Words
Behavior/Action

Motivation/
Drive
Action Factor
Process Act Control
Experiences Cross
Cultural Behave
Important Outward
Thinking

Recurring Summative Content Analysis of
Open-Ended Survey
“Behavior is controlled by the individual; a choice.”
“In any culture the way you behave and your gestures
will show more than what you might be thinking or it
could show your true beliefs.”
“This will be evidently reflected through your
halfhearted and transparent actions. It is said that 85%
of communication is done through body language
(behavior).”
“A person's motivation will dictate his/her behavior.”
“I chose motivation as the first due to my conscious
effort to seek out cross-culture
engagements.”
“without a desire to interact with or understand other
cultures, the others do not matter.”
“Motivation is the stimulus or catalyst for action and
will be the driving factor on how a person chooses to
behave in certain environments.”
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Cognitive/
Knowledge

“Cognitive begins the learning process and is passed
along from relatives or close friends within that culture
at an early development stage.”
“The cognitive aspect is the foundation on which further
cross cultural competencies can be developed.”

Metacognitive/
Strategy

“Metacognitive is how I would control the situation with
the cognitive already ingrained so that would be next to
the least important to me.”
“Metacognitive follows motivation because you are
controlling your learning process and forming it into
certain behaviors based off your motivation and beliefs.

Table 9. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content
Analysis of Negative Experiences in Cross-Cultural Situations
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey NVivo
analysis

Understanding
Led Example
Event Foreign
Military
Cultural
Awareness
Cross Cultural
Team Forces
Interpreter
Experience

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Concepts through Open-Ended Survey

Ugly American and
lack of Cross-Cultural
Awareness

“Ugly American,” “instance of disrespect and oblivious
disregard for another human being,”“American Way,
"arrogant American,” “Americans treating other
cultures as being sub-standard / subservient,”
“the soldiers following orders; being rough and
aggressive to the villagers, breaking their stuff thru the
actions of clearing homes in such a manner, treating
them as sympathizers and threats, and arresting
"suspicious" individuals,” “no motivation to really care
about the differences” “lashed out using adverse
verbiage and threatening body language,” refuse to
work with the individual.”“I was obviously telegraphing
my displeasure”“ranting about the local customs of
driving, their dirty living habits etc.”
“Unknowingly using body language,” “spit chewing
tobacco in a cup inside during a meeting with foreign
military commanders,” “I could literally feel some of the
respect they held for me drain away,” using offensive
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Religious
Beliefs Marine
Ugly American
Body Language
Face Local
Tactical Mission

body language, shouting, and demeaning inferences,
“cultural awareness classes that I have sat through
didn't prepare me,” “Work ethic does not always equate
equally when working in a cross-cultural environments”
Religious
misunderstanding
understanding, political
correctness

“We don't use their laws (Islam) effectively,” “ slave to
political correctness,” “fear of doing or saying
something incorrect,” “never took the verbal cues,
behavior was adversely affected,” “slave to 'cross
cultural' sensitivity.”

Interpreter

“Inaccurate translation.”“field interpreter fails to
convey all of the elder's concerns.”
“everything gets lost in translation.”
“The Interpreters became unexpected power brokers.”

Table 10. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative
Content Analysis of Positive Experiences in Cross-Cultural Situations
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey
NVivo analysis

Develop
Occasions
Operation
Interaction
Village Country
Local
Successful Able
Week Long
Understanding
America
Military
Drinking Cross
Cultural
Involved
Knowledge

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Concepts through
Open-Ended Survey

Develop cross-cultural
relationships

“bilateral goodwill,” “trust and respect,” “Support
human needs to the culture,” basics of food, shelter,
clean water, medical attention.”

Military objectives

“Mutual security.”
“dependence on one another.”
“security regained.”
“Isolated mutual experiences.” -“Intelligence sharing
through trust and respect.”

Food, drink and more

“Shared meals, tea, social gathering.”
“honored with special events like weddings.”
“family and treated as brothers and comradery.”
“living together through trust and respect.”

Cross Cultural
Involved growth

“changing negative perceptions of Americans.”
“mutual safety and security.”
“Medical and military assistance.”
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“sharing of tactical information towards common
goals.”
“sharing of stories with common bonds developed.”
“challenges and learning through trail and error.”
“Reliance on interpreters.”
“interpreter saved out asses”
“personal enlightenment through cross-culture
relationships.”
“positive impact on culture.”
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Table 11. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative
Content Analysis of Cultural Training Courses
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey
NVivo analysis

Special Forces
Qualification
Course Power
Country
Numerous
Training I
Received
Annual Sexual
Harassment
Basic Language
Role Cultural
Awareness Poor
Middle East

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Concepts through
Open-Ended Survey

Special Forces
Qualification Course,
Power, Country
Numerous Training

“general cross-cultural training.”
“Interactions”
“prepared and knowledgeable”
“foreign language training”
“training with ambiguous cultural situations”
“unconventional warfare”

I Received Annual
Sexual Harassment,
Poor

“sexual harassment and general DoD equal opportunity
classes”
“gender and ethnic classes”
“weak”
“adequate”
“Check the box type of training”

Basic Language Role

“Dari, Pashto, Farsi, Arabic”
“Special Forces course language training”
“6 months of training”
“Defense Language Institute.”

Cultural Awareness
and
Middle East Training

“no live role playing”
“Arab culture,
“death by PowerPoint”
“little practical experience”
“lack of encouragement”
“poor and not relevant”
“no practical training”
“trained by people with little experience”
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Table 12. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative
Content Analysis of Visible Factors in the Cultural Iceberg Theory
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey
NVivo analysis

Define
Abundance
Religious
Societies Food
Middle East
Countries
Importance
Music
Depending
Cooking Factor

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Concepts through
Open-Ended Survey

Religion and law of
culture

“Religion is the interesting variable for me. In Islamic
countries I would always place religion at the top of this
list, particularly in a country like Afghanistan.”
“most cultures derive characteristics from their religious
beliefs.”
“culture defined mostly by religion.”
“Religion in those countries heavily influences
literature, fine arts, etc.”
“Religion rears its head quite soon and seems to be the
most profound cultural indicator.”
“Religion=worldview and worldview dictates behavior
and relations with others, particularly in
non-secular societies...”
“Religious beliefs are part of the individual, familial,
and tribal culture.”
“Religion, or lack thereof, shapes the fabric of most
societies, so it is 1.”

Culture dress and food
preparation

“Modest dress, religious considerations (in many cases
that was how they defined their relationship to me).”
“Dress is the first indication of behavior from the other
side of any cross cultural event in a military setting.”
“Dress and cooking options.”
“ethnic food which is another central point for gathering
and commonality among cross cultures, followed by
dress.”
“Dress in the most visible factor in the Middle East.”
“visible factors one immediately takes note
of a person’s dress.”
“can identify where a person comes from by simply
observing the eating patterns of the individual.”
“If a woman is fully covered up tells a strong Sharia or
Muslim culture.”
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Table 13. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative
Content Analysis of What Factors Combat Places on Stress and Cultural
Competency
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey
NVivo analysis

Enemy
Question Host
Answer Event
Level Positive
Experience
Negative
Survival
Individual
Importance
Context Local
Result Qualify
Situation

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Concepts through
Open-Ended Survey

Positive factors of
stress identified

“Combat stress brings allies together. Differences tend to
be overlooked in light of the importance of survival.”
“I have found that stress especially related to combat has
forced me to succeed in cross culture environments due
to the near imperative and necessity for survival.”
“There is no bond like that shared among men who have
faced death together.”
“Combat stress will test the strength of cross-cultural
relationships and can be the difference between mission
failure or success.”
“On rare occasions heightened tensions may force an
individual to focus clearer.”

Negative factors of
stress identified

“When you lose a buddy on a mission the last thing you
care about is taking host nation cultural sensitivities into
consideration.”
“negative, because in the case of combat stress you
revert to what is most familiar and rehearsed.”
“Generally stress has a negative impact on almost all
skills, attitudes, and behavior.”
“This clearly was not an appropriate way to
communicate and was most likely the result of continued
combat stress.”
“In Afghanistan I witnessed several stressful scenarios
which impacted soldiers in such a way that it appeared
as if stress did lead to a negative outcome, and most
certainly, an eventual us vs. them mentality.”
“"we are brothers here banding together to survive in
order to make it home in one piece" and "fuck these
backwards people, I do not care.”
“Combat may result in a hatred for other cultures or
people due to hardship and loss experienced.”
“Stress makes tolerance levels drop, especially in a
combat environment.”
“combat stress will create biased opinions.”
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Table 14. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of
What Factors Combat Places on Stress and Cultural Competency
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey
NVivo analysis

Hands Likely
Foundation
Skills Culture
Education Helps
Practical
Training
Followed
Experience
Believe
Environment
Cross-cultural
Practical
Application

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Concepts through
Open-Ended Survey

Education preference

“Theory through education helps lessen the learning
curve when you go from theory to practice.”
“Education can give you cross-cultural competencies.”
“You must be taught/educated first.”
“Education explains all of the intricate components,
background and overall objectives thus establishing a
solid “groundwork.””
“education can provide intel prior to deployment and
when cultural differences.”
“Practical Immersion without some education of the
"why" is akin to monkey see monkey do.”

Immersion and
practical preference

“The majority of individuals are visual and practical
immersion is a necessity to fully understand and apply
the learned theory.”
“practical training will always stay with a student longer.”
“nothing can replace immersion training.”
“Immersion forces an individual to understand the
intended target audience in order to effectively
communicate and positively influence the outcome.”
“The greater majority of SOF members learn by doing.”
“Hands down, I learned far more about both the
language and the culture while on immersion.”
“Learning very rarely comes from a class room environment.”

Combination of both

“A combination of both is necessary. The saying goes
there is no better teacher than experience.”
“A healthy mix of education and immersion training is
required for a well-rounded SOF operator.”
“One without the other will only reduce or limit the SOF
member. You have to give him the educational tools and
then test him in an environment that allows for mistakes
without major consequences.”
“Education balanced with immersion also is conducive
to a confidence in one’s ability to interact well within a
strange culture.”
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Table 15. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of
What Are the Hidden Factors in the Iceberg Theory
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey
NVivo
analysis

Physical Space
Handle Middle
East Operate in
Order
Approach
Values
Problem
Respect Work
Ethic Own
Perception
Indicators
Family Ranked
Understand

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Concepts through
Open-Ended Survey

Physical space
management

“How space is arranged is key to early insight into any
cross-cultural event.”
“In many cultures physical space especially between a
man and woman can explain a lot.”

Work ethics

“Work ethic is the first thing you will get a feel for in any
new culture.”
“the stronger of a work ethic a culture has, the more
amiable and easier to negotiate with persons of that
culture are.”

Problem solving

“I see a lot of disparity in work ethic and problem
solving when it comes to different nationalities.”
“A significant underlying indicator of cultures is the
approach to problem solving.”
“Despite cultural differences, solving problems is the
ultimate goal.”
“How do they solve problems will tell you more about a
culture than any of the others.”

Religion

“As I mentioned earlier Religion drives every aspect of
their lives.”
“For the most part, Americans are the most insensitive
people regarding modesty and respect for what other
cultures regard as sin.”

Animal and other areas

“I put the animal relationship as more of a red flag.”
“One has to understand the environment in which one is
to operate in order to survive.”
“Sexual behavior / Reproduction is a primary motivator
for all cultures and very powerful.”
“Problem lies with preconceived notions based off of our
learned behaviors from our experiences instead of an
identified culture.”
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Summary of the Study
The purpose of this mixed method explanatory sequential design was to analyze data
gathered through the exploration of three surveys to expore the research questions regarding how
cross-cultural training and education may affect cross-cultural competency in selected groups of
former military Special Operations Force members. The design was to discover purposeful
factors that influence cross-cultural competency through the utilization of these three surveys all
based on the Cultural Intelligence Scale scores.
The results determined that the only measurable correlation in higher Cultural
Intelligence Scale (CQS) scores was related to the number of deployments in which the
individual participated. This provides a possible connection between higher exposure in crosscultural experiences leading to higher CQS scores. This result reflects an argument that these
findings do not reflect many of the stances presented in the literature review, which presented
extended cross-cultural interaction as posing a negative influence to cross-cultural interaction.
These results invite additional exploration that may show increased cross-cultural interaction to
be a positive factor in cross-cultural competency. Additional cross-cultural training, language,
and other factors had no measurable correlation in higher CQS scores.
There was a positive trend identifying a substantial difference between the Cultural
Intelligence Center’s database and Groups A and B. The sample group participants as a whole
performed higher in the rankings compared to the database. Additional research geared toward
CQ and the military community is required to elucidate the results.
Given the absence of significant findings, the research suggests the main finding is that
the respondents had a wide variety of cross-cultural experiences during their time in military
service. This finding does not limit the value of the research, as these experiences were

115
influenced by a number of factors, including the individual’s background, one’s personal past,
one’s training, with whom one interacted while deployed, for example. The cognitive factors
seem the main power behind the reported experiences. Furthermore, there is evidence in the
responses that each participant interpreted questions differently, which contributed to the variants
collected.
In conclusion, the use of a mixed method design was intended to identify factors that
have an impact on Cross-Cultural Competency within the Special Operations community while
identifying varibles that could be connected to CQS scores. The argument is made throughout
the literature review that these men are unique and exposed to extreme conditions and situations.
Further, they are subjected to higher rates of violent combat experiences, an understanding of
which provides one explanation for questions being interpreted in multiple ways by the different
respondents. This could have influenced the findings, for which there is evidence in the mixed
method approach.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
This chapter reviews the findings and identifies areas for future research with a primary
focus on examining what, if any, differences existed between the sample group populations
divided into Group A and Group B. The concept hypothesized that due to the unique mission
requirements of Special Forces “Green Berets,” they would out-perform other Special Operation
units in the study. The sample group consisted of former military Special Operations members
as the foundation, with the concept to examine the Department of Defense (DoD) though the lens
of smaller elite units, which made up Groups A and B.
The research focused on definitive areas within the construct of cross-cultural exchanges,
with the understanding that cross-culture competency occupies a significant place within the
military. Furthermore, the research provided an examination of why cultural understanding is so
important, steps the DoD has taken to identify and modify previous cross-cultural training in the
post 9/11 era, and provides possible areas for future research.
The research specifically examined the Earley and Ang (2003) concept of cultural
intelligence (CQ) and introduced CQ and the self assessment survey referred to as the Cultural
Intelligence Scale (CQS). This chosen tool is utilized to measure sample participants’ levels of
personal cross-cultural awareness. The measurement tool was used to establish a baseline
assessment ranking that correlates the CQS personal assessment scores in several areas. These
areas included (a) examining the sample Groups A and B CQS scores and comparing those
scores against each other.
The purpose was to identify if Group B outperformed Group A, which was defended as a
possibility due to members’ need for higher need for cross-cultural competency. Furthermore,
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the combination of the CQS scores and the results from the demographic survey data were used
to identify correlations between categories and CQS scores; (b) compare the sample groups’
CQS scores against the Cultural Intelligence Center’s database of more than 58,000 participants
to understand how the military compared; and (c) use the qualitative open-ended surveys to
define common ground within the sample groups and to identify positive and negative
correlations in the data.
The results demonstrated a variation of CQS scores between the groups, as well as
identifying that both groups performed extremely well as compared against the database.
However, the only correlations between the demographic survey and the CQS assessement was
the discorvery that the frequency of deployment rates correlated to higher CQS scores.
The open-ended survey allowed for the participants to write opinions, describe
experiences, and share their concept of cross-cultural interaction, which for the majority of the
participants occurred in highly stressful combat environments. This survey was one of the
greatest attributes of this study. More than 55 percent of the (n=54) participants reported three or
more tours in combat areas, with more than 21 percent reporting one to two tours in combat
areas. Less than 15 percent of the participants reported not having experienced combat.
Interpretation of the Results
Although the representation and experience of the former military Special Operations
sample group was notable, the small sample size of the research was a major factor that limited
the exploration of relationship data and trends between demographic variables. Furthermore, due
to the small size of the sample group trends that do exist may not surface without significant
modeling and manipulation, which in an exploratory endeavor would not be a positive position
to assume. The mixed-method design allowed for a practical means to meet with the primary
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limitation of the researcher living and conducting the research from Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and the nessecitiy of relying on online surveys.
The sample group members were selected due to their designation as former members of
the specified groups. The call for assistance was disseminated through multiple Special
Operations Forces private social media groups and did not define specifically or seek a particular
service branch with the exception of Group B, whose members by design were required to come
from the Special Forces, “Green Beret” community (Appendix B). Group A was open to former
members of the Marines, Army, Air Force, and Navy. Although not truly a limitation nor by
design, there were minimal participants representing the Rangers, SEALs, and Para Rescue in
Group A. This was primarily due to the researcher’s access and direct connection to the U.S.
Marine Corps Special Operations community and snowball sampling; thus, the majority of
Group A represented Force Reconnaissance and Marine Special Operations Command Marines.
The study provided insight through the data collection via the mixed-method approach.
The three surveys provided correlations between CQS scores and demographic data, as well as
the addition of the qualitative study conducted to enhance the quantitative data. There were three
areas key to providing useful data toward the construction of conclusions.
Quantitative Phase: Survey Results
The study was designed as an explanatory sequential mixed-method design (Creswell,
2013). The demographic survey was the first issued and laid the foundation for the sequential
surveys. The survey eliminated participants that failed to meet the criteria of membership in
Special Operations Forces, (Green Berets, Rangers, MARSOC, Para Rescue, SEALs or Special
Boat Units) and Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC), (Force
Reconnaissance, Reconnaissance Battalion, and Marine Scout Snipers). It also provided
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invaluable information that led to the correlation that frequent deployment rates lead to higher
CQS scores.
Quantitative Phase: Cultural Intelligence Scale
The CQS was provided to 54 interested participants resulting in 35 total responses. The
CQS provided an individual assessment of each participant as well as group scores from each
respective group. The results from both surveys were used specifically in research questions one
and two.
Qualitative Phase: Open-Ended Survey
The open-ended surveys examined the conscious minds of the sample group participants.
It offered the opportunity to collect solicited data that supported the quantitative information and
allowed for a deeper examination of the participants. In addition to providing new information,
the feedback section provided a review of the warriors’ stories as some of the participants
relayed their experiences in cross-cultural environments. Table 16 provides excerpts derived
from a collection of comments from the sample groups regarding the four factors—cognitive,
metacognitive, behavior, and motivation.
Findings
Although the sample size was small, the data compiled in the qualitative phase are
arguably more illuminating than the quantitative data. For instance, the overwhelming majority
of respondents indicated behavior and motivation as the most important variables of cultural
competence, which surfaced from the cultural iceberg questions in the open-ended survey. The
responses of the hidden factors of the iceberg theory provided deep meaning to the research and
ties directly to the literature review. Therefore, it is reseasonable to connect this data to the
curriculum that the DoD uses to train soldiers in cultural competency.
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The research analysis from this study would suggest that servicemembers respond well to
these areas and future training should be highly reliant on behavior modifications as well as
redirecting and stimulating individual motivation. The importance of motivation has been
repeated throughout the literature review and further reinforced in the quantitative and qualitative
data from this study. Aligning this information with future DoD curricula that incorporate such
relevant knowledge of motivation and behavior factors could prove to be highly successful.
The mixed-method approach offers two primary categories of data collection: first, the
statistical data; second, through the more personal insight produced in words expressed in the
open-ended survey.
The qualitative phase enhanced with the summative approach of the study proved
productive. The findings presented insight to two major areas revealed between Group A and
Group B. The first finding was the difference in the level of cross-cultural training, especially in
the area of language and immersion. The second finding was the identification of major
differences in how each group was introduced to cross-cultural combat or training situations.
Group B (Special Forces members) seemed to present a better understanding and ability to
process correct cross-cultural relationships. Furthermore, this group identified when verbal and
non-verbal errors are made, process the situation, and counter with logical decision making.
The summative concept approach enlightened the multiple layers, which may not have
been so easily identified in stand-alone statistical data. The mixed-method results of the study
suggest that Special Force members are better prepared prior to cross-cultural interaction through
language school and training exercises. Furthermore, the mission of the Green Berets lends itself
to remain highly functional within foreign cultures. Research evidence has also demonstrated
that SF members are immersed in cross-cultural enviroments (embedded with indigenous

121
cultures) more frequently than the members of Group A. The specialty design of the Special
Forces team serves them well and provides an immediate welcome to their presence in many
cultures. Some of these needs were identified in the open-ended survey as important and
positive factors of interpersonal, cross-cultural acceptance with the attention to basic human
needs (food, shelter, clean water, medical assistance, and protection).
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Table 16. Direct Versus Euphemistic Understandings Through Summative Content Analysis of
Question 1 of the Open-Ended Survey, Understanding of Cognitive, Metacognitive, Motivation
and Behavior Importance.
Summative Content Analysis

Survey
Monkey
NVivo analysis

Action Factor
Process Act
Control
Experiences
Cross Cultural
Behave
Important
Outward
Thinking

Frequent Identified
Words

Recurring Summative Content Analysis of
Open-Ended Survey

Behavior/Action

" Behavior is controlled by the individual; a choice.”
“In any culture the way you behave and your gestures
will show more than what you might be thinking or it
could show your true beliefs.”
“This will be evidently reflected through your
halfhearted and transparent actions. It is said that 85%
of communication is done through body language
(behavior).”

Motivation/Drive

“A person's motivation will dictate his/her behavior.”
“I chose motivation as the first due to my conscious
effort to seek out cross-culture engagements.”
“Without a desire to interact with or understand other
cultures, the others do not matter.”
“Motivation is the stimulus or catalyst for action and
will be the driving factor on how a person chooses to
behave in certain environments.”

Cognitive/Knowledge

“Cognitive begins the learning process and is passed
along from relatives or close friends within that culture
at an early development stage.”
“The cognitive aspect is the foundation on which further
cross cultural competencies can be developed.”

Metacognitive/Strategy

“Metacognitive is how I would control the situation with
the cognitive already ingrained so that would be next to
the least important to me.”
“Metacognitive follows motivation because you are
controlling your learning process and forming it into
certain behaviors based off your motivation and beliefs.

The Special Forces team may be better equipped and possess the ability to serve a small
cross-cultural community with a vast amount of specific skills that include leadership, language,
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high level of medical skill, engineering, communication, and defensive tactics. The important
factor the SF team introduces is specialty skills, which are required to work independently, but
perhaps more important is that their skills provide a direct link to the basic human survival needs
that transcend to any culture in the world. This differs from Group A members, who are more
direct-action-based, meaning they are less reliant on cross-cultural interaction and with an
entirely different mindset, mainly due to a different mission statement. Through the mixedmethod research data it is clear that sample Group A was not as well prepared for the crosscultural challenges as Group B was. This was especially clear in the open-ended survey, with
many references to inadequate cultural training and no foreign language preparation, including
complaints there was a lack of knowledge passed along, and not even providing basic training
with host language key phrases.
Such lack of preparation for Group A leads to more mistakes made in the field, as their
only exposure to the culture is through forced immersion. More negative factors surfaced from
Group A and less tolerance for understanding the culture in which they were operating was
evident in the open-ended survey. Although a lack of preparation and training was more
prevalent in Group A, they still managed high CQS scores, which may suggest military members
are highly suitable for cross-cultural interaction. Cross-cultural mistakes were reported from
both groups with two especially interesting situations reported from Group B.
On two separate occasions members from Group B reported major interteam cultural
mishappenings that caused great disrespect to host nationals. This experience was reported to be
so difficult that, in both cases, the respondants claimed to have never spoken with the offenders
since. Group B members’ awareness appears to be extremely keen and sensitive to the nature of
cross-cultural competency—more so than that of Group A.
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The open-ended survey responses from Group B provided extended explanations of
cross-cultural situation awareness leading to the hypothesis that the mission statement and
training Group B possesses makes them more adept to identify cultural mistakes and offer
alternative methods to prevent future mistakes. Group A responded more with an “us versus
them” attitude and even when cultural mistakes were made, the members from Group A seemed
to dismiss them with no ill feelings towards the offenders.
Group B also commented that a great amount of their learning is gathered through
interactions with other seasoned team members, who provided useful information about areas of
operation. The qualitative survey provided depth to the research and boosted ambiguous
quantitative results, which this researcher believes were due to the low sample group numbers.
Viewing the three surveys through the qualitative lens allowed a better grasp of the data.
Examining the descriptive statistics with the open-ended survey provides a clearer overall picture
of the findings.
Key Implications
These are examples of key associations that surfaced in the study and will be important to
consider in selecting future research.
Self and peer evaluations. Combining self and peer evaluations would provide a more
in-depth picture of the individual and allow for a more thorough review of the CQS between the
participant and the CQ representative. The peer evaluations provide a useful end product that
negates the potential bias, such as an individual presenting a strong, unchecked social bias. This
is highly possible in any study, with participants answering the way they think society wants
them to answer. The literature review presented a case of large deviations between self- and peer
evaluations (Braziel, 2011).
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This case study presented the problem of self-evaluations and how individuals might
view their own actions as in tune with the cross-cultural situation under the assumption they
were operating correctly, while peers or host nationals draw a completely different conclusion.
As Braziel’s (2011) study demonstrated this scenario, without the peer evaluation the military
Foreign Affairs Officers would have continued believing their behavior was agreeable to the host
nationals. The CQS does allow for a peer evaluation; however, the peers are selected by the
individual and are liable to support the individual’s bias.
A clearer path would offer the flexibility for coworker’s involvement, whereas in the case
of this study it would have provided military unit members an opportunity to report how the
individual’s actions are perceived through the eyes of peers.
Better understanding stress. The correlation of higher CQS scores to more frequent
deployment schedules argues against literature presented in chapter 2, which contended that due
to frequent deployments of SOF units, their ability to manage stress was diminished. One
hypothesis for the correlation may be that many of the participants have been removed from
combat for a period of time that has allowed them to settle and transform stress into positive
cognitive power. This possibility, combined with natural increased motivation levels that may
be responsible for positive behavior change, may be attributed to the length of time out of the
service. This is an area that requires additional research to fully identify the trend.
Allocating supporting commitments to training across DoD. The lack of an accepted
method to measure individual cross-cultural self-awareness is important in establishing a
program to be evaluated over time. The decision should be made where and when to introduce
cross-cultural training and to monitor data to evaluate if a particular direction improves service
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members’ awareness. Further, using a system to evaluate possible cross-cultural challenges
could be the first step to avoid the next international incident.
Summative concept approach to qualitative open-ended survey data. The use of the
summative concept approach of the open-ended questions produced remarkable data that was not
obvious from the qualitative Survey Monkey and NVivo software word generating tools. The
open-ended survey comments yielded additional information that far outweighed and redirected
the true attention of the qualitative process. The following is a brief summary of the eight areas
where discussion was encouraged with the summary reflecting the actual phrases and words
selected from the 30 respondents of the open-ended survey.
Four factors of importance. The key words selected by the NVivo Survey Monkey
software were “Action, Factor, Process, Act, Control, Experiences, Cross Cultural, Behave,
Important, Outward Thinking.” These words alone do not express the participants’ responses,
but through the summative approach, the researcher was able to extract and articulate the intent
of the participants. The key area most discussed was the weight placed on the importance of
behavior and motivation.
These conclusions were echoed throughout the open-ended survey. A few participants
examined the cognitive factors and defended these as a basis for one’s current path, although the
defense evolved around the importance of behavior and motivation. There was also a correlation
warranted between metacognitive and behavior; an agreeable argument of the researcher as well.
The relearning and reshaping of cognitive factors is part of the learning process and behavioral
change.
Positive cultural events. The key words selected by the software were, “Develop,
Occasions, Operation, Interaction, Village, Country, Local, Successful, Able, Week Long,
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Understanding, American Military, Drinking, Cross Cultural, Involved, Knowledge.” These
words alone do not express the participants’ responses fully, but through the summative
approach, the researcher could extract the participants’ intent. A summary of key concepts
suggests positive cultural interaction delivers bilateral goodwill through the support of basic
human needs, (food, shelter, security, and medicine). Additional attention was focused on the
sharing of meals, stories, common bonds, and the shared experience of isolation.
Negative cultural events. The key words selected by the software were “Understanding,
Led, Example, Event, Foreign Military, Cultural Awareness, Cross Cultural, Team, Forces,
Interpreter, Experience, Religious Beliefs, Marine, Ugly American, Body Language, Face, Local,
Tactical, Mission.” These words alone do not express the participants’ responses fully, but
through the summative approach, the researcher was able to better extract the intent of the
participants. The key areas that were most discussed described an “Ugly American.”
Additionally, there were several critical points drawn about not using religion and Islamic law to
assist in the mission, with political correctness hindering actual progress by using the tools the
culture is using.
One of the most common areas discussed and one that directly relates to cross-cultural
awareness and good communication skills was the issue of body language. Verbal and nonverbal communication are an important part of being cross-culturally competent. For many of
the warriors who did not possess Arabic, Dari, or Pashtu language capabilities, there was a great
reliance on non-verbal communication. Many negative examples are discussed throughout the
survey.
Throughout the survey descriptions of mistakes were made that ranged from using
chewing tobacco to outright humiliation and mistreatment of the local indigenous community.
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This question offered the most enlightening examination of problems of cross-cultural
interaction between the military and the indigenous populations that are affected by their
presence.
Cultural training. The key words selected by the software were “Special Forces
Qualification Course, Power, Country, Numerous Training, I Received Annual Sexual
Harassment, Basic Language, Role Cultural Awareness, Poor, Middle East.” These words
provide a brief understanding of the descriptions told by the survey participants; however, they
fail to fully provide the deep explanation of the responses. This was one of the questions that
offered a greater volume of qualitative data and allowed for clear distinctions between Groups A
and B. Group A appears to be much less prepared for cross-cultural interaction than Group B.
The Special Forces Qualification Course (Q Course) (Group B) alone has built-in training
that places the students in ambiguous cross-cultural situations. After completion of the Q course,
the members from Group B continue cultural endeavors at the Defense Language Institute where
they are immersed into an assigned language. The classroom immersion introduces students to
language and culture experts, thus providing them a strong foundation. Group A members are
not exposed to such intense, focused training and are more likely to report receiving a class from
someone who is not an expert on the culture discussed.
Although both groups reported receiving the standard equal opportunity and sexual
harassment classes, Group A members were the only ones to answer the questions with
comments such as, “weak, painful, inadequate, and just checking the box.” Group B members
report positive cultural training. Finally, although both groups encouraged more training of any
type, the majority agreed that practical, reality-based training and immersion was of most use.
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Visible iceberg factors. The key words selected by the software where, “Define,
Abundance, Religious, Societies, Food, Middle East Countries, Importance, Music, Depending,
Cooking, Factor.” Religion and Islamic law were frequently discussed as being a part of the
visible concepts from the iceberg theory. As most of the participants worked in Islamic cultures,
this was an obvious area that dominated the answers. Religion has a strong presence in all the
responses and the reality of religious connections to nearly every visible factor, demonstrates that
religion truly intertwines every aspect of Islamic life.
As the theme of religion continued, the next areas where most agreed involved the
importance of local dress (clothing) of the culture as a key signal, followed by food. Others
considered even deeper expressions that literature, art, and games also play an essential role in
defining the visible factors. One participant from Group B picked up and expanded on language
as being the largest factor that is visible in the iceberg theory. This response was interesting as
many different languages are spoke in Afghanistan, but to provide context, these languages are
regionally specific.
Hidden iceberg factors. The key words selected by the software were, “Physical Space
Handle Middle East, Operate in Order, Approach, Values Problem, Respect, Work Ethic, Own
Perception, Indicators, Family, Ranked, Understand.” They key concepts from the content
focuses heavily on work ethic and problem solving, as these two areas were the theme of the
majority of respondents. Additionally, the concept of religion was present, but again, this
response in the survey is to be expected with such a high concentration of the sample group
working in Islamic cultures. Another area that surfaced was the attention given to the
observation of physical space and how space is managed by a culture.
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Many of the respondents commented on judging some of these hidden factors of positive
perceptions on how physical space was organized. Furthermore, there was great attention given
to how the culture treated animals. Given that animal rights are associated with western culture,
and many throughout the world view animals far differently than Americans, it was concerning
that the respondents placed such importance on this factor, although it is understandable. Other
less mentioned areas but still notable included the perception by a culture of beauty, sin, laws,
tribal rules, and animals’ connection to wealth and survivability.
Preferred method of training—education or practical. The key words selected by the
software were, “Hands, Likely, Foundation, Skills, Culture Education Helps, Practical Training,
Followed, Experience, Believe, Environment, Cross-cultural, Practical Application.” This was
one of the areas where Groups A and B agreed on the overall importance of practical training.
Although defense was given for education (theory) instruction, most participants
encouraged the combination or preference of practical and immersion training. Many examples
were provided over concern that the best method to instruct a warrior is through hands-on
training. This was proposed as role-playing, reality based training, direct immersion in culture,
and the sharing of stories from other team members, all of which prepare an individual for what
the culture will have in store for them.
Stress and combat stress effect on cross-cultural communication. The key words
selected by the software were, “Enemy, Question, Host, Answer, Event, Level, Positive
Experience, Negative, Survival, Individual Importance, Context, Local, Result, Qualify
Situation.” This was another area that defined the two groups with a noticeable trend, with
Group A more pessimistic and Group B supporting a more optimistic view. Some of the most
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negative answers were produced from Group A participants. The question was described in two
parts after reading through the responses.
With regard to negative and positive stress, surprisingly there were many responses
reporting positive conditions taken from high combat stress situations. The discussion offered
that stress might bring allies together in a common fight, where differences tend to be overlooked
in light of the importance of survival. Reporting that stress, especially related to combat, forced
some to succeed in cross cultural environments due to the near imperative and necessity for
survival. Other comments relayed the correlation between the stress of combat and death and
that the very bond that is shared among men who have faced death together is a positive
condition. Another acknowledged concept is that combat stress will test the strength of crosscultural relationships and can be the difference between mission failure or success, and on rare
occasions, heightened tensions may force an individual to focus more clearly.
The negative concepts were dark in some cases, as expected from such hostile conditions
that combat brings. Responses concerning the welfare of Marines was the only concern, and
when losing a buddy on a mission, the last thing one cares about is taking host nation cultural
sensitivities into consideration. A very interesting connection to proper preparation for these
situations was explained as in the case of combat stress, where one reverts to what is most
familiar and rehearsed. The truth that one will not rise to the occasion, but instead lower to the
training, is borne out by the data. Generally, stress has a negative impact on almost all skills,
attitudes, and behavior.
Instances were relayed where military members reacted differently to the same situation
as one participant from Group A described a situation in Iraq. During a turnover of area
responsibility, the new leadership overreacted to a controlled situation. The participant described
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the actions as clearly not an appropriate way to communicate and were most likely the result of
continued combat stress. Other stories relayed from Group A in Afghanistan described
witnessing several stressful scenarios that had an impact on soldiers in such a way it appeared as
if stress did lead to a negative outcome, and most certainly, an eventual “us versus them
mentality.”
Other comments defined the “us versus them mentality,” with one participant from Group
A explaining they were all brothers, banding together to survive to make it home in one piece,
and "fuck these backwards people, I do not care.” Finally, the understanding emerged that
combat may result in a hatred for other cultures or people due to hardship and loss, which
induces the stress that makes tolerance levels drop, especially in a combat environment. That is
to say, combat stress may create biased opinions.
Recommendations for Future Study
Future study offers a plethora of areas that require definition and exploration. The first
area of recommendation is that the DoD continue to pursue a measurement tool to assess and
evaluate DoD military members throughout their years of service. More importantly for that
concept to be useful is to establish a timeline to select the tool to be used to measure 3C.
Cultural intelligence is just one option used in this study. By selecting a measurement tool, the
study provided a foundation to compare two groups.
Additional attention directed at the SOF community could prove invaluable in future
study. Concentration on one joint service entity should prove a worthy basis to expand research
to all members of the DoD. The DoD has not been without adventure in its pursuit to assist
military leadership on the battlefield. The Human Terrain System (HTS) provides a solid
example of alternative thinking and, because the program did not mature to a permanent
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program, does not indicate it was without success. Many in military leadership expressed
support and relayed stories of success with the HTS program but internal conflicts within the
social science community were not well thought through as the DoD sought a quick correction
with a “stop, shoot, and aim” mentality. This is a continuing process and, with the current lull in
action, it is now a suitable opportunity to stop, aim, and shoot.
One area of concern and for future study involves the stress element of cultural
intelligence. As one participant commented in the open-ended survey, combat stress caused the
individual to revert to what is most familiar and rehearsed. Grossman, (2008) an expert on the
military, combat stress, and mindset, elaborates on this idea through a scientific foundation on
the importance of understanding stress inoculation training. This training is used to prevent a
fear-induced stress response that will occur without prior training. This fear-induced stress
response is what pushes the individual to revert to what is most familiar and activates a defensive
mechanism that can prove harmful to stakeholders (Grossman, 2008). Grossman, (2008) argues
that “In combat you do not rise to the occasion, you sink to the level of your training” (Chapter
2). Cultural intelligence and awareness have been an afterthought and are not built in to the core
fundamentals of the warrior ethos the combat mindset usually entails. Thus when stressed, the
combination of the body’s “fight or flight” response and learned experiences of the warrior may
overshadow what may be assumed as an understanding of cultural intelligence.
Summary of the Study
The summary of this study reflects responses provided by a small unique sample group
representing former servicemembers with special skilled backgrounds. It has been mentioned
throughout the study that the intent of any research should be to add to existing studies and to
encourage others to expand understanding of the topic. The mixed-method design of this
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research study provided a check and balance for the research; both complemented one another
and addressed the research questions that guided the study.
The study demonstrated the importance of the qualitative component of the research.
When examining Cross-Cultural Competency, the words of the sample group hold great weight
in the study. Without the qualitative side of this research, the study would have been incomplete;
furthermore, it would not have relayed a true sense of the major concerns when addressing crosscultural interaction in combat areas. The sample group presented not only a highly trained
Special Operator, but one who has frequent deployments to a hostile combat area. This sample
group has witnessed first-hand the horrors of war and is a group willing to discuss their
experiences and personal stories.
Learning through storytelling is a gift and one that has been used throughout human
history as it addresses the need for communication with one another. Through the open-ended
survey, there seemed to be a need from the participants to discuss their stories and to pass along
important parts of their individual stories. Perhaps for many, this was the first time they were
able to relay their stories through the lens of a cross-cultural learning environment. Moreover,
there is evidence that many of these warriors are similar in their core specialty training and
mindset; although there remain diverse outcomes from their individual experiences. The
researcher discovered there are connections to cross-cultural education through experiences.
In conclusion, experience is an interesting concept that the majority of the participants
stressed. The sample group made clear the importance of learning by practical exercise over
purely theoretical education. Overwhelmingly, the sample group identified positive learning
through practical exercise, immersion type training, and by learning through “sharing of stories”
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from peers who have experience with a specific culture. This research study presented data that
is relevant to contemporary military concerns in the arena of cross-cultural competency.
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Appendix B
Call for assistance and participants

Gents, I am a former infantry and Force Reconnaissance Marine and in my fourth year of a doctoral
program at the University of New England. I am conducting research on Cross-Cultural Competency
within the military by using a current business model called Cultural Intelligence (CQ). I have
selected two uniquely special groups to use as my target populations.
Group one consists of former Special Operation Force members (MARSOC, Force Recon, SEALs,
SF, Rangers and PJ’s) who served pre- and post-9/11 and are no longer in the military. Group two
consists of only former Army Special Forces members. Also participants should have at least part of
that service post-9/11, and both combat and non-combat experience is fine.
Participant Requirements: About an hour of your time is needed to take three surveys in the
privacy of your choosing via an online format. One is a Survey Monkey questionnaire with only
demographic questions. The second is a Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) provided through the
Cultural Intelligence Center and the third is an open-ended short answer survey. After receipt of
your email you will be provided links to all these surveys and consent forms to complete and return
to the researcher. Once the surveys are competed your email address will be removed from the
research.
Thank you in advance for your assistance and if there are any questions I am more than happy to
address them for you in a private message on Facebook or may provide you an email address to
contact me.
Life long learner,
John Buffin
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Appendix C
Consent for Participation

University of New England
CONSENT FOR PARTCIPATION IN DEMOGRAPHICAL AND
CULTURAL
INTELLIGENCE SCALE RESEARCH SURVEY’S
Project Title:
A Mixed Method Study of Former Special Operations Community: Identifying Factors That
Effect Cross-Cultural Competency
Principal Investigator(s): John Buffin, BA in Organizational Management,
Ashford University; Master of Professional Studies in Homeland Security,
Pennsylvania State University, (203) 788-3142 or johnbuffin@gmail.com. Dr.
Grania Holman, faculty advisor, gholman@une.edu, 1(678)234-2414
University of New England Consent for Participation in Research
Introduction:
General requirement language:
The purpose of this form is to provide you with information about the research
study and, if you choose to participate, to document your decision.
Please ask any questions about this study, now, during, or after the project is
complete. Once you agree and commit to the research you will be sent an email
with links to three surveys. The research is dependent upon the prompt
fulfillment of the surveys and you are given seven days to complete the surveys.
Each survey is brief and should not consume more than 30 minutes of your time
to complete. Your participation is voluntary but appreciated by the researcher.
Why is this study being done?
This research is conducted to identify variants and similarities of cultural
competence between former Special Operation Force (SOF) members using the
Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) personal assessment survey. In particular the
research will compare Army Special Forces “Green Berets” as a group to other
members of the SOF community. The findings will be used to determine if
cultural intelligence (CQ), currently used as a tool in the business arena to
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measure one’s level of cultural intelligence self-awareness, may be used within
the military as a tool to identify variants between the two groups CQS scores,
which ultimately seeks to assist warriors to improve cross-cultural self-awareness.
This research study is used in the principal investigator’s doctoral dissertation and
proves a valuable link to further research within the military units and within
Special Operation Force community.
Who will be in this study?
As a part of a specific community within the Special Operations family, you are
among the target population selected for the study. The participants hale from all
branches: Army’s Special Forces; Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance; Scout
Snipers; MARSOC Raider Battalions; Army Rangers; Navy Seal Air and Land
(SEALs); Special Boat Unit; Air Force Para Rescue; and the 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) commands.
What will I be asked to do?
There are three surveys that will be emailed to you with hyperlinks to each. Two
of the hyperlinks are an online platform you have likely experienced in the past
known as Survey Monkey. The first is a basic survey to gather your demographic
data through five cultural awareness questions, which will primarily be used to
assign you into one of two groups. Group I will consist of all Special Operations
members with the exception of Army Special Forces (SF). The Army SF
members will make up group II. The second survey comes from the Cultural
Intelligence Center and is known as the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS). The
CQS contains twenty questions on how you would feel in certain cross-cultural
situations. It measures your cognitive, metacognitive, behavior, and motivation in
the context of cross-culture interactions. This data provides the Center with
information about you and compares your responses to over 58,000 other surveys
collected from participants from 98 countries within the business arena. At the
conclusion of the CQS personal assessment survey you receive a report that
outlines your score and provides a written explanation with suggestions as to why
you scored the way you did. The third survey is an open-ended survey where
short descriptive comments about cross-cultural interaction will be required. If
you have further questions after the completion of the CQS the researcher will be
free to review your results. Contact John Buffin at johnbuffin@gmail.com for
further questions.
None of the methods used in this research study are experimental or unusual.
Although your participation is brief, it will provide critical data essential to
adding to existing research within the private sector and the Department of
Defense research database. This is essential to expanding research for the future
success of cross-cultural competency.
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Your participation in this study is via your personal email account and you will be
asked to provide a limited amount of personal information. This will be the only
identifying information, which will only be seen by the researcher. At the
completion of the collection of the final surveys all personal information will be
destroyed and your data will only be identified as a participant in Group I or II. If
you have additional questions please feel free to contact John Buffin
johnbuffin@gmail.com.
What are the possible risks of taking this study?
There are no reasonable foreseeable risks associated with participation in this
study. If you have additional concerns or questions feel free to contact John
Buffin.

What are the possible benefits of taking this study?
Your personal contribution to this research is significant and, while it may not
directly benefit you in the short term, it provides future research designed to assist
with positive and productive methods to enhance an individual military member’s
capability in war and at home. The findings will inform how an individual’s selfawareness is built and how well an individual is able to communicate in a crosscultural environment.
What will it cost me?
The two surveys take approximately thirty minutes to complete and you may stop
and pick back up at anytime. We suggest you allow thirty minutes in a quiet
place to complete the surveys in one shot but this is up to you and your schedule.
Review the questions briefly and provide honest answers.
How will my privacy be protected?
Your privacy and the security require protection of data and confidentiality and it
is the first priority of the researcher. There is limited personal information kept
during the research process, (only email address in the initial stage and your name
provided to the Cultural Intelligence Center for the CQS). As your total
anonymity in the study is impossible to obtain, email addresses and names will be
assigned a pseudonym label and your email address and name will be removed
after the surveys are completed; only a label identifier Group I or Group II
remains. This approach serves to transition the study from a confidential study to
an anonymous study once your true email address is excluded.
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To further ensure confidentiality the data is stored on a personal passwordprotected laptop; password-protected external, back up hard drive; and maintained
in a secure location to which only the researcher has access. The trust and bond
built between researcher and you must continue and is achieved through careful
collection, limitation, and eventual removal of your self-identifying information.
Feel free to contact John Buffin johnbuffin@gmail.com with any privacy
concerns or questions.
How will my data be kept confidential?
In the aforementioned section about privacy no personal information will be kept
about you at the conclusion of the surveys. The data will be stored on passwordprotected computers and external hard drives at the home office of John Buffin.
Further, all of the research materials will be kept in a secure area under lock and
key within the home office of John Buffin.
Please note that the University of New England Institutional Review Board (IRB)
is a committee formally designated to approve, to monitor, and to review
biomedical and behavioral research involving humans and may review the
research records.
A copy of your signed consent form will be maintained by the principal
investigator for at least 3 years after the project is completed before it is
destroyed. The consent forms will be stored in a secure location that only the
researcher will have access to and will not be affiliated with any data obtained
during the project.
Transfer of data via the internet will be necessary to facilitate this study and all
data will be downloaded and maintained on hard drives and not in any cloud
system.
The research findings will be posted in the dissertation of John Buffin for his
Doctorate in Education at the University of New England. An electronic copy can
be made available if requested by a participant.
What are my rights as a research participant?
Your participation is voluntary. Your decision to participate will have no impact
on your current or future relations with the University of New England.
You may skip or refuse to answer any question for any reason.
If you choose not to participate there is no penalty to you and you are free to
withdraw from this research study at any time, for any reason.
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Whom may I contact with questions?
The researcher conducting the study is John Buffin. For questions or more
information concerning this research you may contact them at: John Buffin
johnbuffin@gmaill.com (203)-788-3142.
The committee chairperson is Dr. Grania Holman who may be reached at
gholman@une.edu(678) 234- 2414.
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you
may call Olgun Guvench, M.D. Ph.D., Chair of the UNE Institutional Review
Board at irb@une.edu or by phone at (207) 221-4171.
Will I receive a copy of this consent form?
You may copy this electronic version for your records, which will serve as your
copy of the consent form.
Participant’s Statement
I understand the above description of this research and the risk and benefits
associated with my participation as a research subject in the demographic and
Cultural Intelligence Scale personal assessment survey and the possibility of
being selected for the open-ended qualitative survey. I agree to take part in the
research and do so voluntarily. I understand that as this is an electronic version of
this agreement, a typed name in the signature line is acceptable if a signature
cannot be reasonably completed and returned to the researcher.
Please sign and return this consent within two days of receipt to confirm your
participation in the study.

________________________________________________________
Participant’s signature or printed name

_________________________________________________________
Printed Name

Date
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Appendix D
Quantitative Demographic Survey I

Cultural Intelligence
1. What is your age?
17 or younger
18-20
21-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60 or older

2. Please select from the choices below with what race you identify.
White
Black or African-American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
From multiple races
Some other race (please specify)

3. In which U.S. Region did you spend most of your youth or do you
consider home?
New England
Middle Atlantic
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East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

4. Do you identify with any of the following religions? (Please select all that
apply.)
Protestantism
Catholicism
Christianity
Judaism
Islam
Buddhism
Hinduism
Native American
Inter/Non-denominational
No religion
Other (please specify)
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5. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest
degree you have received?
Less than high school degree
High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor degree
Graduate degree

6. What is the highest level of school your father completed or the highest
degree he received?
Less than high school degree
High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor degree
Graduate degree

7. What is the highest level of school your mother completed or the
highest degree she received?
Less than high school degree
High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
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Bachelor degree
Graduate degree

8. In what branch and unit did you serve?
USMC Infantry
USMC MARSOC (Raiders, Force Recon, Recon BN, Scout Sniper)
US Navy SEAL
US Navy SWCC SBU
US Army Special Forces or CAG
US Army Rangers
US Air Force Para Rescue
Aviation 160th
Other (please specify)

9. What was your highest military rank?
E1–E4
E5–E6
E7–E8
E-9
O1–O3
O4–O5
O6
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10. Other than English, what languages do you speak at any level?
Chinese
Italian
Japanese
German
Portuguese
Arabic
French
Russian
Farsi
Thai
Other (please specify

11. How important is it to understand the culture for you to be successful
at your job?
I do not really understand different cultures and do not think it is necessary for me to
adjust my behavior to conform while working in a different culture. If I remain true to by
beliefs, I will be able to work in any cultural environment.
I understand culture differences; however, find little to no value in accepting culture
and do not see this as an important part of me being successful while working in a
different culture.
I think that understanding culture is important but do not feel it necessary for me
to change my behavior to be successful in working within a different culture.
I think understanding culture and adjusting my behavior while working with a
different culture is an important and contributing factor to be successful while
working in a different culture environment.
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12. Please chose the best answer below. Be sure to read carefully the
definition of combat for the use of this survey.
Have not served in combat
Have served in combat and received Combat Action Badge or Ribbon but with little or
limited contact to firefights or IED's
Have served in combat and received Combat Action Badge or Ribbon and
exposed to heavy firefights and IED's

13. On how many combat deployments have you been?
0
1
2
3 or more

14. How long have you been out of the military?
1-4 years
4-6 years
6-10 years
10-15 years

15. Where are you currently working? Select all that apply.
currently working overseas as a contractor, direct hire or in some other
connection to the United States Government or private business
Not currently working
Some form of advanced education (tech school, formal school, College)
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Working in business or other technical fields within the United States
Involved with government work that relates to my military service (law enforcement,
Department of State ATAP, medical, DHS, or other OGA)
Other (please specify)

16. I would consider myself to be culturally tolerant and do not offend
others around me that may be from a different culture or religious belief
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neutral
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree

17. In some situations I find it helpful to place others' cultural
considerations ahead of my personal cultural beliefs
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neutral
Somewhat agree
Strongly disagree

18. I engage when I am immersed in different cultures
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
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Neutral
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree

19. I find myself more cautious when working in cross-cultural situations
and think more about my words and actions
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neutral
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree

20. I understand and appreciate the diversity of cross-cultural
situations or environments
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neutral
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
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Appendix F
Qualitative Open-Ended Questionnaire
Please read all four of the following definitions prior to answering this question. After you
understand each definition place a number 1–4 next to each definition, with 1 the most important
to 4 the least important. After ranking the definitions, state your reason for the choices you made;
one to two short paragraphs are appropriate. As this is a qualitative survey, your complete
responses are required to fulfill its use.
Cognitive defines the beginning of your learning process. Family and friends may pass along
feelings and beliefs at this developmental stage to influence your personal culture and belief
system. These may form your primary feelings about other cultures and relationships in crosscultural situations.
Metacognitive represents the control of your cognitive learning and how you approach that
knowledge in any given situation.
Motivation follows on your metacognitive ability and how personally motivated you are to act in
any given situation. In this case, it concerns your motivation to involve yourself in cross-cultural
settings and participate with others.
Behavior signifies verbal and physical gestures that you use when working within a crosscultural environment. This is the product that is viewed by others around you. Think of this in a
strictly cross-cultural environment; as in, is your behavior important in a cross-cultural
environment.
1. According to what you believe, rank the four words listed below from 1–4, with 1 the most
important and 4 the least important. There are no wrong answers here; it is simply what you
believe.
•
•
•
•

Behavior
Motivation
Cognitive
Metacognitive

2. Please explain and describe your choices here in one to two short paragraphs.
3. In one to two short paragraphs, describe a negative experience involving a cross-cultural
situation during your military service. This does not have to be a personal story; it may be one of
which you know.
4. In one to two short paragraphs please describe a positive experience involving a cross-cultural
situation while you were in the military. This does not have to be a personal story; it may be one
of which you know.
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5. While on active duty, did you receive any cross-cultural or cultural training? This includes all
cultural training (sexual harassment, racism, Arab culture, etc.)
If your answer was yes to question #5, please comment on the training you received.
What are the visible factors you associate as key indicators of one’s culture? Rank these factors
in importance from 1–5, with 1 most important and 5 least important. See Figure 1 below:
Iceberg Theory of Culture
•
•
•
•
•

Literature, fine arts, music, and dancing
Games
Cooking
Dress
Religion

8. In at least one paragraph, please provide an explanation of your choices ranked in question #7.
9. What are the hidden factors you believe are underlining indicators of a culture? Rank these
factors in importance 1–9, with 1 most important and 9 least important. Again, see Figure 1
below: Iceberg Theory of Culture
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Courtship practice and sexual behavior
Nature of friendship
Patterns of handling emotions
Arrangements of physical space
Approaches to problem solving
Appearance and how beauty is perceived
Work ethic
Definition of sin
Relationship to animals

10. In at least one paragraph, please explain your choices to questions #9.
11. Does stress, especially combat stress, place a positive or a negative outcome on cross-cultural
relationships?
Positive
Negative

12. Please explain your reasoning to your answers in question #11 and provide a personal
experience if available.
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13. As a Special Operations Force member, which do you value more: education or practical
immersion training?
Education
Practical Immersion Training
An even or weighted combination of both, please explain below
14. Please provide the reason behind your selection in question #13.
Figure 1. Iceberg Theory of Culture

